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Internal auditing is not only an important element of international businesses, but also a 
crucial component of the company’s internal control and risk management. Audit 
committee’s main objective is to ensure the trustworthiness and credibility of financial 
statements by monitoring the process of financial reporting. Internal auditing and audit 
committees serve each other to generate reliable financial statements. The available 
resources for internal audit department is monitored by audit committee, whereas internal 
audit department reports internal control activities to audit committee. The main objective 
of this study is to examine the impact of audit committee members expertise (accounting 
experience, auditing experience, BIG Four experience, academic qualification and 
professional qualification) on internal audit budget in the context of Malaysia. The sample 
of this study includes the top 100 firms listed in Bursa Malaysia over three-years period – 
from 2015 to 2017 to examine the proposed relationship. The regression analysis shows 
that audit committee members accounting experience and professional qualifications have 
a positive and significant impact on internal audit budget, while audit committee members 
who worked at BIG Four firms and acquire academic qualification have negative and 
significant effect on investment in internal audit. The theoretical, academic, regulatory and 
practical implications were explained in detail showing how policy makers, practitioners 
and academics can benefit from the current study.   
















Pengauditan dalaman bukan sahaja merupakan elemen penting dalam perniagaan 
antarabangsa, tetapi juga merupakan komponen penting dalam kawalan dalaman dan 
pengurusan risiko syarikat. Objektif utama jawatankuasa audit adalah untuk memastikan 
kepercayaan dan kredibiliti penyata kewangan dengan memantau proses pelaporan 
kewangan. Pengauditan dalaman dan jawatankuasa audit saling melengkapi antara satu 
sama lain dalam menghasilkan penyata kewangan yang boleh dipercayai. Sumber sedia 
ada untuk jabatan audit dalaman dipantau oleh jawatankuasa audit, manakala jabatan audit 
dalaman melaporkan aktiviti kawalan dalaman kepada jawatankuasa audit. Objektif utama 
kajian ini adalah untuk menyelidik kesan kepakaran ahli jawatankuasa audit (pengalaman 
perakaunan, pengalaman audit, pengalaman BIG Four, kelayakan akademik dan kelayakan 
profesional) terhadap belanjawan audit dalaman dalam konteks Malaysia. Sampel kajian 
untuk meneliti hubungan yang dicadangkan terdiri daripada 100 buah firma teratas yang 
tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia dalam tempoh tiga tahun (2015 – 2017). Analisis regresi 
menunjukkan bahawa pengalaman perakaunan jawatankuasa audit dan kelayakan 
profesional mempunyai kesan positif dan signifikan terhadap yuran audit dalaman, 
sementara ahli jawatankuasa audit yang bekerja di firma BIG Four dan memperoleh 
kelayakan akademik mempunyai kesan negatif dan signifikan ke atas pelaburan dalam 
audit dalaman. Implikasi teori, akademik, kawal selia dan praktikal yang dijelaskan secara 
terperinci menunjukkan bagaimana pembuat dasar, pengamal dan ahli akademik boleh 
mendapat manfaat daripada kajian semasa. 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
After a series of corporate accounting scandals and intentional manipulations such as 
WorldCom, Enron, Tyco, Satyam and Barings worldwide, investors’ confidence in capital 
markets decreased to the lowest point ever (Alzeban & Sawan, 2015). Investors’ 
confidence deteriorated to involved audit firms and accounting profession as a whole which 
resulted in growing concerns towards the role of corporate governance in recent years 
(Ebaid, 2011). Corporate governance mechanisms have been called for to face and 
eliminate such collapses (Endaya & Hanefah, 2016). One of the most significant 
mechanisms that has been used recently is internal audit function (Coram, Ferguson, & 
Moroney, 2008; Sarens & Abdolmohammadi, 2011). Both scholars and regulators have 
emphasized in the important role of internal controls to ensure the validity and reliability 
of financial statements (Salehi & Bahrami, 2017; Khlif & Samaha, 2016). 
 
In response to these corporate accounting collapses, many countries passed laws to limit 
the ability of corporations to commit fraudulent activities and manipulations. The United 
States of America Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the United Kingdom 
passed the combined code of 2000 and 2009, Australia issued Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program (CLERP) 9 2004, Spain issued Unified Good Governance Code 2006, 
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Germany issued Corporate Governance Code 2009 and many other countries including 
Malaysia issued codes on corporate governance that all listed corporations should follow. 
 
Corporate governance techniques have been called for to enhance the monitoring role over 
financial statements. The American Act and the codes pushed for more concentration on 
the importance of internal auditing and internal controls. Therefore, many corporations 
have shifted their focus towards internal audit lately to fulfil the corporate governance 
codes requirements. Furthermore, statistics about internal audit in the U.S showed that 
investment in internal audit and internal audit employees number increased by more than 
10% over 2001 and 2002 (Carcello, Hermanson, & Raghunandan, 2005).  
 
Internal auditing is not only an important element of international businesses, but also a 
crucial component of the firm’s risk management and internal control (Anderson, Christ, 
Johnstone, & Rittenberg, 2012). A survey organized by Ernst and Young (EY) Malaysia, 
the Institute of Internal Auditors Malaysia (IIAM) and the Malaysian Institute of Corporate 
Governance (MICG) in 2000 proved that internal auditors serve as vital consultants to 
minimize risks, and they are in a place that enable them to comprehend the company’s 
business practices 1. Internal audit aims to protect the interests of shareholders mainly and 
stockholders as well, improve firm’s performance and assist the company in achieving its 
                                                 
1 Ernst & Young, Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) and Institute of Internal Auditors 




goals by evaluating its internal control, governance and risk management (Carcello et al., 
2005).    
 
Internal audit is one of the mechanisms that company’s owners utilize to overcome agency 
theory problem. Agency theory explains the conflict that rises between managers (agents) 
and shareholders (owners) in a company where the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is not 
the owner of the firm (Jensen & Mecklings, 1976). Agents will always try to maximize 
their wealth against the interests of the company’s owners, so agency theory suggests the 
use of external and internal corporate governance mechanisms to eliminate this conflict 
(Jensen & Mecklings, 1976). Audit committee (AC) is one of the most significant 
mechanisms to reduce this conflict since it is expected to monitor the financial reporting 
process, in particular to monitor internal and external auditors’ works and internal control 
system (Hermanson & Rittenberg, 2003). 
 
The characteristics of audit committee (e.g. expertise, independence, tenure and diligence) 
have been studied by many researchers up to date. The current research will investigate 
factors of audit committee expertise such as accounting experience, auditing experience, 
experience with BIG Four audit firms, academic qualification and professional 
qualification. The presence of accounting expertise on AC will lead to decrease internal 
control problems and increase financial reporting quality (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008; 
Hoitash, Hoitash, & Bedard, 2009; Naiker & Sharma, 2009). The presence of auditing 
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experience on the AC is even more effective at minimizing internal control failures as 
explained by SOX 404 (Naiker & Sharma, 2009).  
 
To guarantee the financial reporting quality, the vital function of audit committee and 
effective internal audit in reinforcing the outlook of financial reporting and the framework 
of corporate governance of the company has been discussed by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and academic researchers (Mat Zain & Subaramaniam, 2007). A 
successful internal audit function reinforces audit committees with fraud and risk analysis, 
accounting procedures independent evaluation, and confirmations about company’s 
internal control (Hermanson & Rittenberg, 2003). Furthermore, audit committee has the 
responsibility to get internal audit plan reviewed and to ensure that internal audit function 
scope is proper (Mat Zain, Subramaniam & Stewart, 2006). 
 
The motivation of this study stems from the significance of effective internal audit function 
and audit committees in corporate governance processes and financial reporting. A few 
studies have examined the association between audit committee characteristics and internal 
audit function (Goodwin, 2003; Mat Zain et al., 2006; Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2010; 
Yasin & Nelson, 2012; Anderson et al., 2012, Adel & Maissa, 2013; Alzeban & Sawan, 
2015; Alzeban, 2015; Oussii & Taktak, 2018). This study extends the above researches by 
examining the effect of specific factors of audit committee members expertise on 
investment in internal audit. Malaysian listed firms are required to announce internal audit 
budget information and audit committee information in their annual reports. This made it 
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easier for academic researchers to study the relationship between these important factors 
(Al-Dhamari, Almagdoub, & Al-Gamrh, 2018).   
  
1.2 Problem Statement   
Companies are progressively developing their practices of corporate governance, risk 
management and internal control due to the growth of ethical practices, accuracy of cost 
management, corporate accountability and transparency of financial reporting. One of the 
major practices of corporate governance is internal audit which is important to firms since 
it produces services to management such as preventing fraud, fraud analysis, assurances 
regarding internal control, risk analysis and ensuring compliance with firms’ policies and 
government regulations (Hermanson & Rittenberg, 2003).  
 
In Malaysia, there are many cases of firm mismanagement and corporate failures, which 
proves the need for effective and efficient internal auditing in the private and public sectors 
(Ali, Saidin, Sahden, Rasit, Rahim, & Gloeck, 2012). Examples of these incidents include 
Malaysian Airline Financial Scandal, 1Malaysia Development Berhad and Genting 
Malaysian Berhad. According to Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan (2007), private and public 
corporations in Malaysia lacks competency in internal audit and internal audit staff 
efficiency. They also argued that the Malaysian government could not provide enough 




 In addition, audit committee members are usually appointed by managers who run the 
company (Abdullah, Yusof, & Mohamad Nor, 2010). Therefore, it is hard to expect audit 
committee members to challenge management decisions. Researchers also believe that 
audit committee members act as a rubber stamp for management decisions and it is only 
formed to comply with Bursa Malaysia requirement (Zulkarnain & Shamsher, 2007). So, 
it is necessary to discover the effectiveness of audit committee in monitoring the works 
performed by internal auditors and to what extent companies are willing to invest in 
internal audit function (Diamond, 2002). 
 
Internal audit adds value to the company by equipping it with necessary assurance that its 
exposure to risk is properly managed and comprehended (Walker, Shenkir & Barton, 
2003). It assists to monitor a firm’s risk profile and distinguish areas to develop risk 
management techniques (Lindow & Race, 2002). An effective internal audit department is 
able to strengthen the internal control environment of a company by reviewing periodically 
the structure of internal control and overseeing the information system operations and 
control techniques on behalf of the managers (Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006). They also 
added that an efficient internal audit function can safeguard the company against theft of 
its assets and fraud from management and employees as well. Due to many essential 
functions of internal audit, it is necessary to understand how much a company should invest 




Audit committee’s main objective is to ensure the trustworthiness and credibility of 
financial statements published by the firms by monitoring the process of financial reporting 
(Bradbury, Mak, & Tan, 2006). The main characteristics of audit committee to perform its 
monitoring role on the process of financial reporting and internal control are financial 
experience, independence, meeting regularly (BRC, 1999). According to Nelson and Devi 
(2013), audit committee financial expertise includes accounting and financial experience, 
auditing experience, academic qualification and professional qualification. A study 
conducted by Mohamad-Nor, Shafie & Wan-Hussin (2010) explained that almost 40% of 
audit committee members possessed an accounting or finance background. Audit 
committee and internal audit department (IAD) should be closely communicated with top 
management to get benefits of their activities by the overall corporation (Soh & Martinov-
Bennie, 2011). As a result of this, it is necessary to investigate the possible correlation 
between audit committee members expertise and investment in internal audit in Malaysia.   
      
Prior studies examined relationship between AC and external audit related factors (fees, 
audit report lag) and internal control. However, limited studies investigated the relationship 
between AC and internal audit budget such as Barua, Rama and Sharma (2010); Al-
Dhamari et al. (2018). These studies looked at several characteristics of AC and did not 
provide a clear picture on the effectiveness of AC expertise characteristics and how it 




The current study is different from Barua et al. (2010) and Al-Dhamari et al. (2018) studies 
in two different dimensions. First, both studies examined the association between audit 
committee characteristics (AC composition, AC expertise, AC independence, and AC 
meetings) in general and internal audit budget, while the present study solely focuses on 
the association between one characteristic of audit committee (AC expertise) and internal 
audit. Expertise can be perceived in many ways (academic, qualification and work 
experience), so different types of expertise may lead to different outcomes. Second, Barua 
et al. (2010) used data that goes back to 2001, 2002 and 2003 and Al-Dhamari et al. (2018) 
used data from 2015 to 2017, while the current research covers data that are published 
recently (2015-2017).  
 
In addition, Barua et al. (2010) had carried out their research in the U.S. where ownership 
is dispersed and a clear separation between ownership and control exists, whereas the 
current study is carried out in Malaysia where ownership is concentrated at family 
members, major institutions, or government bodies and the separation between ownership 
and control is not clear. Moreover, Al-Dhamari et al. (2018) study only controlled for firms 
factor and internal audit factor (omitted variables), while the current study controls for all 
areas. The present research enriches and complements the prior researches by investigating 





 1.3 Research Questions 
Research questions for this study are: 
1. Is there a significant relationship between AC experience and internal audit budget? 
i. Is there a significant relationship between AC experience in accounting and 
internal audit budget? 
ii. Is there a significant relationship between AC experience in audit and internal 
audit budget? 
iii. Is there a significant relationship between AC members experience who have 
worked at BIG Four audit firms and internal audit budget?  
2. Is there a significant relationship between AC qualification and internal audit 
budget? 
i. Is there a significant relationship between AC members academic qualification 
and internal audit budget? 
ii. Is there a significant relationship between AC members professional 
qualification and internal audit budget?  
 
1.4 Research Objectives  
The main objectives of this study are:  
1. To examine the relationship between AC experience and internal audit budget. 




ii. To examine the relationship between AC experience in audit and internal audit 
budget. 
iii. To examine the relationship between AC members experience who have 
worked at BIG Four audit firms and internal audit budget. 
2. To examine the relationship between AC members qualification and internal audit 
budget. 
i.  To examine the relationship between AC members academic qualification and 
internal audit budget. 
ii. To examine the relationship between AC members professional qualification 
and internal audit budget.  
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
The significance of the present research relates to its contribution to audit committee and 
internal audit practice and literature as well in many ways. The current study provides 
empirical evidence from an emerging nation that may assist enriching the current literature 
on audit committee and internal audit. Moreover, this study helps to comprehend internal 
audit profession in the world and Malaysia in particular by investigating the correlation 
between audit committee members expertise and internal audit budget.  
 
Furthermore, this study will reinforce policy makers and organizers perceptions on the 
impacts of audit committee members expertise and internal audit budget in the environment 
of Malaysia, where protecting minority shareholders’ interests and stakeholders’ interests 
by law enforcement needs to be improved, and internal audit function role to enhance the 
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financial reporting process remains unknown. The findings of this research can be valuable 
for the Malaysian authorities such as Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) 
and Bursa Malaysia to plan, execute and design practices that perfectly suit the internal 
audit department of Malaysian public firms.   
 
The current study will be beneficial to researchers and academics whose focus areas of 
research are internal audit and audit committee expertise. This study discusses current 
issues where future research can be conducted to support the quality of audited financial 
statements and accounting information among firms. Literature on internal audit is still 
limited, so this study can provide more knowledge to those who wish to investigate in 
internal audit area. Furthermore, the present study adds to agency theory literature by 
investigating the suitability of agency theory to elaborate the role of AC in monitoring 
internal audit function and how internal audit and audit committee are considered as main 
mechanisms to reduce agency costs.     
 
1.6 Definition of Key Terms 
To increase the study clarity, the definitions of key terms are provided as follow: 
 
1. Corporate Governance 
A method employed to manage and direct the business and the company’s affairs towards 
encouraging business growth and corporate responsibility with the objective of achieving 
long-term shareholder wealth and value, while taking into consideration the other 
stakeholders interests (MCCG, 2017). It also concerns the association among board of 
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directors, corporate managers and shareholders. Further, the relationship of the company 
to stakeholders in particular and society in general (Ben Bouheni, Ammi, & Levy, 2016). 
 
2. Audit Committee 
Audit Committee has been defined by Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) as a body that is formed 
amongst and by the BOD to monitor the financial and accounting reporting procedures and 
processes of the issuer and oversee the financial statements audit procedure.   
 
3. Audit Committee Financial Expert (ACFE) 
ACFE is an individual who possesses the following characteristics: a comprehension of 
financial statements and generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), experience in 
auditing, preparing, evaluating, or analyzing financial statements, a comprehension of 
internal control system over financial reporting, and a comprehension of audit committee 
roles and functions (SEC, 2003). Bursa Malaysia listing requirements define ACFE as 
members with accounting or managerial experience and academic qualification.   
 
4. Internal Audit Budget 
Internal audit budget refers to salaries, travelling, trainings, allowances, bonuses and out-
sourced services (Wan-Hussin & Bamahros). 
 
1.7 Scope of the Study  
The main objective of this study is to examine the association between audit committee 
members expertise and internal audit budget in Malaysia. The current study covers top 100 
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listed companies on Bursa Malaysia since they reflect a huge part of Malaysian economy. 
The top 100 companies were selected because they provide enough data about internal 
audit and AC in their annual reports. The research period covers 2015, 2016, and 2017. 
 
1.8 Organization of the Study 
The organization of the current study follows the following pattern: Chapter two provides 
a discussion on prior literature about investment in internal audit and audit committee 
members expertise. It also explains the significance of corporate governance and its 
development in Malaysia throughout the years. Chapter two also discusses the underlying 
theory used in this study. In chapter three, the study shows the research framework and 
how hypotheses were developed. This chapter also elaborates research method used in the 
current study and examines data collection, sample selection, study period, techniques of 
data analysis, and variables measurement. Chapter four shows the analysis of correlation, 
the descriptive analysis, diagnostic tests, regression analysis and sensitivity tests. Finally, 
chapter five displays a summary of the study and discusses its findings, limitation and 











The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a literature review on the areas of internal 
audit function and audit committee. The structure of this chapter follows the following 
pattern: Section 2.2 provides an overall review on corporate governance in Malaysia and 
how it was developed throughout the years ending with releasing the new MCCG of 2017. 
Section 2.3 looks at literature conducted on internal audit function in general and internal 
audit budget in particular. Section 2.4 depicts the overall function of audit committee, 
describes the meaning of audit committee members expertise which include experience 
and qualification and looks at prior literature covered those variables in different contexts. 
In section 2.5, we explain the theory employed in this study. Finally, section 2.6 provides 
a summary that concludes. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance depicts the relationship between the owners of the firm and its 
management to direct the corporation towards achieving its objectives. The governance 
role in directing the management towards success is a controversial topic that has been 
under debate among academics, regulators, corporate owners, and managers. Most 
problems that result in economic crisis in different countries can be pointed back to poor 
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corporate governance (Faleye & Krishnan, 2017). Many boards of directors failed to 
execute their primary role successfully which is to monitor and oversee the management. 
As a result, many managers made poor decisions and took much risks to gain profits in the 
short-term only and huge losses in the longer-term (Faleye & Krishnan, 2017). Corporate 
governance techniques are perceived as important tools to make mangers lead the 
corporation in a pattern that aligns with the shareholders’ interests, thus reducing the 
agency problem and its costs (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Chen, Lu, & Sougiannis, 2012). 
 
Strong governance happens if a suitable level of overseeing and control in the firm exists 
(Cadbury, 1997). A good corporate governance can improve the level of confidence of the 
investors and stakeholders and develop company’s brand name (Gupta & Sharma, 2014). 
This is because the investors perceived that companies that have a good corporate 
governance will have a better credibility and good performance (Wijethilake, Ekanayake, 
& Perera, 2015). In addition, a good corporate governance will enhance corporate 
transparency by ensuring a greater disclosure on financial and non-financial information 
and can protect shareholders’ rights (Shamsudin, Abdullah, & Osman, 2018). 
 
After the various corporate scandals that occur around the world such as Enron, different 
developing and developed countries emphasized on the need for better corporate 
governance to limit such scandals and regain the trust of investors (Hashim & Devi, 2008). 
The Asian financial crisis of (1997-1998) and many corporate scandals in Malaysia such 
as 1Malaysia Development Berhad and Malaysian Airlines scandals served as a caution for 
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the Malaysian authorities to focus more on corporate governance mechanisms that could 
increase transparency and trustworthiness of Malaysian corporations. The Malaysian 
government induces listed companies to follow the best practices of corporate governance 
that could be found in Bursa Malaysia’s Corporate Governance Guide (2007, 2009, 2017) 
and the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance MCCG (2000, 2007, 2012, 2017). 
Those practices include the mechanisms of corporate governance that lead to company’s 
prosperity such as internal audit function and audit committee (Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 
2007).  
  
Many governments have put pressure on public and private corporations to form 
independent internal audit function to monitor the management performance. Internal audit 
as an overseeing mechanism is supported by Coram, Ferguson and Moroney (2008) who 
found that companies that employ internal audit function are more likely to detect fraud 
and misappropriation of assets. Their finding provides an insight about the significance of 
internal audit function as a corporate governance mechanism by reinforcing the monitoring 
tool to detect and report fraud.  
 
In addition, audit committee is also seen as a controlling mechanism to guard the interests 
of shareholders, so it has been taken serious attention from regulators worldwide. The 
National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD 2000), the Public Oversight Board 
(POB, 1993) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have put pressure and 
regulations on the importance of audit committee role as a monitoring mechanism over the 
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process of financial reporting and overseeing the relationship between a company’s 
external auditor and its management (Abbott et al., 2003). Such attention has given the 
birth for the Blue-Ribbon report which calls for developing the audit committee 
effectiveness in a firm (BRC, 1999). 
 
2.2.1 Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
MCCG (2000) emphasized the responsibilities and roles of audit committee as part of the 
board of directors. It suggested audit committee to take care of the problems arising from 
controlling and dominant shareholders and asked audit committee to fully play their role 
as independent directors in the organization. In 2007, the MCCG was revised to come up 
with more strict rules to perform the duties of board of directors and audit committee more 
effectively. MCCG (2007) recommended all listed firms to form an audit committee as part 
of the board whose members are mostly independent and at least one of them is a member 
of an accounting body or association. MCCG (2007) suggested to form audit committee 
from at least three members. In April 2010, the Security Commission established the Audit 
Oversight Board to reinforce the credibility and trustworthiness of the process of financial 
reporting in Malaysia.  
 
The Security Commission revised MCCG again in 2012 to obtain excellence in the 
practices of corporate governance by emphasizing the roles of the BOD in general and 
audit committee in particular (MCCG, 2012). MCCG (2012) asked for more monitoring in 
how independent and proper the external auditor is since the independence of external 
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auditors can be compromised when they perform non-audit services for the same company. 
As in common, the audit committee should get an assurance from the external auditor 
stating that a high level of professionalism and independence have been maintained 
throughout audit process and internal audit function is performed in-line with the country’s 
specific regulations and accounting and auditing standards. The regulations made by Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirement revised on 2013 required all listed companies to form 
internal audit function and required internal auditors to report directly to the audit 
committee in order to increase company’s independence. In addition, MCCG (2012) also 
recommends all listed companies to disclose all information related to the internal audit 
function in their annual report, and they also need to disclose information related to internal 
audit function  such as the cost of internal audit and whether the internal audit function is 
performed in house or outsourced (Johl, Johl, Subramaniam, & Cooper, 2013). 
 
 In 2017, The Malaysian Security Commission revised MCCG once again to focus on the 
internalization of CG culture. This focus does not concern only listed companies, but 
MCCG (2017) also induces non-listed firms such as small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs), government enterprises and licensed intermediaries to adopt the code. The 
Malaysian code consists of 36 practices to fulfil three main principles namely board 
leadership and effectiveness; effective audit, risk management, and internal controls; and 




A new dimension presented in MCCG (2017) is the Comprehend, Apply and Report 
(CARE) approach where firms need to first understand the spirit of the code, apply all 
practices and then report to the required authority. The code also shifted from “comply or 
explain” to “apply or explain an alternative’. Under this new approach, the companies must 
apply all MCCG practices taking into consideration the environment surrounding them; 
however, if the company finds itself unable to apply any of the code practices, it has to 
apply an alternative that could achieve the desired objective and explain why it has used 
that alternative (MCCG, 2017). The code also introduced what is called “Step-up” to 
induce firms to achieve better corporate excellence such as the establishment of risk 
management committee and form an audit committee that encompasses of all independent 
directors (MCCG, 2017). 
 
 The newly revised code put the burden on audit committee to ensure that internal audit 
department in a company is functioning independently from the management; therefore, 
audit committee should decide the work scope, budget, removal, appointment and 
performance evaluation of internal audit department. MCCG (2017) requires the board to 
disclose whether internal audit staff are involved in any conflicts of interest which could 
compromise their independence, resources assigned for the internal audit function, name 
and qualification of the chief internal audit, and whether a recognized framework was 





2.3 Internal Audit 
The institute of internal auditors (IIA) defines internal audit as “An independent, objective 
assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and improve an organization’s 
operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, 
disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, 
control, and governance processes” (IIA, 2004). It is clearly obvious from the definition 
that internal audit function has shifted from assets safeguarding and assuring compliance 
to ensuring value-added and providing consulting services through its duties in evaluating, 
monitoring and risk management improvement (Bou-Raad, 2000). The definition included 
consulting and assurance as part of internal audit function to enhance the new extended 
role of internal audit that concentrates on the significant issues of risk management, control 
and governance (Anderson & Chapman, 2002) 
 
Internal audit is one of the essential basis to acquire an effective corporate governance. 
One of the main parts of corporate governance is internal audit department that plays a key 
role in supporting the board and the management to meet their goals and objectives 
(Rittenberg, Moore, & Covaleski, 1999). Ruud (2003) added that in the modern world of 
companies, internal audit has a main upholding role for external auditors, audit committee, 
management, BOD and other stakeholders. Part of the extended role of internal audit 
includes ensuring that the management performance and works are aligned with relevant 
practices and laws in the country. Internal audit also provides recommendations to the 
company on how to develop their governance and internal control processes (Ebaid, 2011).  
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Internal audit function (IAF) plays as an effective base for internal control aside with audit 
committee and BOD in achieving excellent corporate governance (Prawitt, Smith, & 
Wood, 2009; Soh & Martinov-Bennie, 2011). Internal audit report helps to supplement 
existing governance disclosures and strengthen the reliability of financial reporting and the 
confidence of stakeholders in governance quality (Archambeault, DeZoort, & Holt, 2008). 
An efficient internal audit function can safeguard the company against theft of its assets 
and fraud from management and employees as well. Asare, Davidson and Garmling (2008) 
argued that internal auditors are unlikely to agree to management’s incentives to misreport 
information. Internal audit is recently considered a very important part of global businesses 
since it assists to have a better risk management and a greater structure of internal control 
in a company. Rittenberg et al. (1999) showed that one major part of corporate governance 
is internal audit function as it assists the firm to meet its objectives along with the 
management and the BOD. 
 
 Firms that have internal audit department are considered larger, more competitive, more 
liquid and profitable, highly regulated, better management control and stricter to apply 
accounting standards (Wallace & Kreutzfeldt, 1991). Internal audit is organized in various 
cultural and legal environments within companies that differ in aim, structure and size and 
it is also carried out by different individuals inside or outside the firm (Fadzil, Haron, & 
Jantan, 2005). International Auditing Standards (IAS) induce external auditors to review 
and consider the duties performed by internal auditors and their effects on audit procedures 
(Wan-Hussin & Bamahros, 2013). 
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To develop internal audit function, internal auditors should have enough experience and 
skillful communication abilities (Gramling & Hermanson, 2006). Ge and McVay (2005) 
argued that a weak quality of internal control is caused by spending few resources to 
accounting controls. To emphasize the importance of skills and qualifications, the Institute 
of Internal Auditors requires internal auditors to have knowledge, skills and competencies 
necessary to perform their responsibilities effectively (IIA, 2005; 2008). 
 
To achieve a successful internal audit in an organization, internal audit department should 
be provided with enough resources. An effective internal audit function requires sufficient 
resources to cover the qualitative and quantitative demands of the audit procedures. Two 
major aspects decide the aggregate quality of IAF: the quality of professional care 
employed and the quantity of audit work and effort (Mat Zain et al., 2006). For example, a 
larger internal audit department is supposed to have more employees, thus it can be 
assumed that internal audit scope would cover larger samples when compared to a smaller 
internal audit department (Mat Zain et al., 2006). The above issues emphasize for the need 
to invest in internal audit function to develop its oversight and internal control roles.  
 
Some papers have discussed the importance of internal audit for a firm. Wallace and 
Kreutzfeldt (1991) used US audit firms as their sample finding that internal audit has a 
significant relationship with client characteristics such as industry, client’s size, audit 
committee presence, and financial condition. Based on interview and questionnaire 
responses from external and internal auditors in Saudi Arabia, Al-Twaijry, Brierley and 
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Gwilliam (2004) study found that external auditors tend to believe that one major indicator 
of internal audit quality is its size. Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) tested whether 
Australian listed companies use internal audit and found only tierce of the companies have 
internal audit department. Their findings revealed a positive association between 
commitment level to risk management and client size and the existence of IAD. 
 
Furthermore, Mat Zain et al. (2006) study revealed a positive correlation between 
contribution of internal auditors to the financial statements as evaluated by internal auditors 
themselves and size of internal audit department. Another study showed factors that affect 
the capacity of internal audit employees namely, number of audit assignments carried out 
by internal auditors, firm’s size, internal auditing and industry decentralization, and the 
significance of capital markets for the firm (Gronewold & Heerlein, 2009). A similar study 
by Sarens and Abdolmohammadi (2011) proposed some factors of internal audit 
employees’ capacity. Their findings showed that the ownership structure, firm’s size and 
variety of reporting levels are vital determinants of how large internal audit department 
should be in Belgian companies. 
 
Moreover, Singh and Newby (2010) reported a positive relationship between external audit 
fees and the existence of internal audit department in a firm. This result indicates that firms 
utilize internal audit as a complementary way to audit budget in order to support the 
aggregate control environment. However, Ho and Hutchinson (2010) argued that the 
existence of internal audit department leads to a less audit fees. Their results showed that 
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internal audit function substitutes for some external auditing procedures, which lead to 
external auditor’s reliance on the activities performed by internal audit department. 
 
A study by Suwaidan and Qasim (2010) in Jordan found that internal auditors’ competence, 
objectivity and work performance are considered as important elements affecting the 
external auditor reliance on internal auditor’s activities. However, the study revealed no 
relationship between external audit fees and external auditor reliance on the internal 
auditor’s work. A recent study by Oussii and Taktak (2018) reported that the quality of 
internal control in Tunisian listed companies is positively and significantly related to 
involvement of audit committee to review internal audit scope of work, internal audit 
process and internal audit staff competence. Prior studies have examined internal audit 
function in the context of different independent variables such as clients’ characteristics 
and audit committee characteristics, but the studies in internal audit field still need more 
attention since this type of audit was not a major concern for many countries until the late 
decade of 1990s 
 
2.3.1 Internal Audit Budget 
Internal audit function costs encompass of salaries, travelling, trainings, allowances, 
bonuses and out-sourced services (Wan-Hussin & Bamahros, 2013). In other words, 
internal audit budget refers to the amount of investment or money a company is willing to 
pay for internal audit department if it is done in-house or to be paid to outsourced party in 
order to conduct internal audit process. MCCG (2017) recommends all listed companies to 
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disclose the number of resources invested in internal audit function for the financial year 
which explains the significance of financial resources to perform effective internal audit. 
 
A well-funded internal audit department should have greater overseeing ability to reveal 
and report material misstatements since huge resources allow IAF to hire competent and 
qualified staff (Prawitt et al., 2009). Similarly, Johl et al. (2013) reported a well-resourced 
internal audit department has a better capability to limit fraud and decrease management 
opportunism.  Despite the fact that accessible financial resources to internal audit 
department are pivotal to allow the IAF to supply audit committee with effective 
overseeing and monitoring over the financial reporting processes and management 
performance, limited studies have examined the results a company gets when investing in 
the IAF. 
 
Companies that face crucial risks tend to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of IAF 
monitoring process by allocating more commitment to IAF (Carcello et al., 2005). Internal 
control strength is usually correlated with sufficient and accessible monetary and non-
monetary resources being allocated to the department of internal audit (Ge and McVay, 
2005). As a result, internal audit capabilities and financial resources enable internal 
auditors to possess a good comprehension of their corporate governance roles and facilitate 
performing corporate governance roles by the management team (Schneider, 2008). 
Furthermore, investing in internal audit function boosts the skills, capabilities and 
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competence of internal audit department staff leading to effective internal audit procedures 
and better control of financial reporting (Lin, Pizzini, Vargus, & Bardhan, 2011).    
   
In the context of internal audit budget, Carello et al. (2005) study revealed that leverage, 
operating cash flows, firm size, industry type, and inventory intensity have significant 
positive correlation with investment in internal audit. The study revealed that internal audit 
budget tends to be higher when reviewed by audit committee. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins 
and Kinney (2007) and Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007) found a negative relationship 
between disclosure of internal control ethics and investment in internal audit function. 
Wan-Hussin and Bamahros (2013) and Pizzini, Lin and Ziegenfuss (2014) study examined 
the relationship between audit delay and internal audit budget finding that the more 
investment in internal audit function, the less audit delay.  
 
2.3.2 Audit Committee Characteristics and Internal Audit Budget 
There are several studies that focused precisely on the relationship between audit 
committee characteristics and internal audit budget (e.g. Barua et al., 2010; Alzeban, 2015; 
Al-Dhamari et al., 2018). Barua et al. (2010) studied a sample of 181 listed companies in 
the U.S and found that internal audit budget has a negative association with audit 
committee members tenure and audit committee members expertise, while it has a positive 
association with audit committee meetings which is a proxy for the diligence of audit 
committee. In Addition, Alzeban (2015) covered all companies listed on Saudi Stock 
exchange (TADAWL) in the year of 2014. The study aimed to examine the impact of AC 
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industry expertise on internal audit characteristics such as IA budget and IA size finding 
that members of AC who possess both auditing and industry expertise have greater impact 
on internal audit characteristics than members whose expertise rely on industry experience 
only. 
 
Furthermore, Al-Dhamari et al. (2018) study covered a sample of 100 firms listed on Bursa 
Malaysia for the period 2012-2014. It aims to study the effects of audit committee 
characteristics on internal audit budget. The study revealed a positive and significant 
relationship between audit committee meeting and index and internal audit budget. The 
results also indicated a negative and significant effect of audit committee tenure on internal 
audit budget; however, audit committee members independence and expertise have no 
significant association with investment in internal audit.   
 
Barua et al. (2010) measured audit committee members expertise as auditing experience 
and accounting experience, neglecting the importance of having academic and professional 
qualifications to enhance experienced members with proper knowledge. The current study 
intends to study several factors of expertise that may affect internal audit budget. In 
addition, Barua et al. (2010) study was conducted in the U.S which has dispersed ownership 
of corporations and a clear separation between ownership and control exists, while the 
current study examines the relationship in Malaysian context where ownership is 
concentrated at the hands of family members, major institutions, or government bodies and 
the separation between ownership and control is not clear. Furthermore, Barua et al. (2010) 
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study examined old data 2001-2003 before the international financial crisis of 2008, while 
the current study examines recent data. 
 
Alzeban (2015) measured audit committee members expertise as auditing expert and 
industry expert. He neither considered members who have accounting experience nor 
members qualifications in related fields. Alzeban (2015) conducted his study in Saudi 
Arabia where corporate governance practices still primitive, while the current study 
examines the relationship in the Malaysian context which has enforced better corporate 
governance practices. Furthermore, present study extracts data from annual reports, 
whereas Alzeban (2015) study uses questionnaires sent to internal audit chiefs.  
 
Al-Dhamari et al. (2018) study focused on audit committee members auditing or 
accounting qualification, while experience was not taking in mind. The current study 
focuses in experience and qualifications as well. It is true that Al-Dhamari et al. (2018) 
study was conducted recently, but the data was extracted for the period of 2012-2014 which 
is before the release of the newly revised MCCG (2017). The present study considers data 
before and after the release of MCCG (2017), so the companies are more likely to adopt 
better practices regarding internal audit function and audit committee.  
 
2.4 Audit Committee  
Audit committee is perceived as a sub-committee of the firm’s BOD which maintains a 
healthy and appropriate connection among external auditors, internal auditors, other board 
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member and the management (Salleh & Haat, 2014). Effectual audit committee members 
can ensure focus, independent judgment and transparency required to monitor the process 
of financial reporting (MCCG, 2017). The code also states that the suitable level of skills, 
commitment, knowledge and experience of audit committee members is important to the 
capability of AC to perform its duties effectively and efficiently. The Malaysian Securities 
Commission (SC) declared the necessity for audit committee in a company back in 1993. 
Bursa Malaysia requirements regarding audit committee include appointing no less than 
three members for this committee in which most of them are independent directors, at least 
one of them is a member of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), or has enough 
qualifications and experience in accounting to be called financially literate.  
 
MCCG (2017) proposes that all audit committee members to be financially literate and 
have enough comprehension of the firm’s business. This will allow audit committee 
members to apply a critical view in the firm’s transactions, process of financial reporting 
and other information. It will also allow them to question the manager’s assertions on the 
firm’s financials. MCCG (2017) elaborates one of the audit committee main duties which 
is reviewing and providing recommendations on whether the company’s financial 
statements represent truly and fairly the performance and financial position of the same 
company. The definition of audit committee members who is financially literate is the 
ability to read and understand financial statements and reports, the ability to comprehend 
and realize the usage of accounting standards and the ability to provide effective criticism 
and raise questions about the firm’s activities on risk management and internal controls 
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(Bursa Malaysia, 2009). The Blue-Ribbon Committee BRC (1999) suggests the inclusion 
of one financial expert in the audit committee. 
 
Several duties are the accountability of audit committee such as understanding the 
disagreements between external auditor and management and how to resolve them, 
understanding audit judgements, comprehending auditing issues and procedures needed to 
tackle them and keeping a healthy communication with external and internal auditors 
(Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010). According to DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and Reed 
(2002) an effective audit committee is a committee that encompasses members with 
resources, power and high qualifications to ensure the protection of shareholders’ interests. 
Audit committee can fulfil this protection by strengthening internal controls, managing 
risks and ensuring high quality of financial statements.  
 
Parker (1992) reported that audit committee is considered a channel that connects the 
external auditor, BOD and internal control system. Audit committee can effectively 
safeguard the interest of shareholders by guaranteeing effective internal controls, managing 
risks and financial reporting quality during its overseeing duties. Audit committee 
independence and expertise are vital elements that can limit audit report lag and thus ensure 
timeliness (Hashim & Abdul Rahman, 2011). Effective audit committee protects 
shareholders’ interest since it ensures that financial reporting, internal control and external 
auditing works are performed in-line with owners’ interests (Bedard & Gendron, 2010). 
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To be effective, audit committee characteristics should include, among others, audit 
committee expertise (Xie et al., 2003). 
 
2.4.1 Audit Committee Members Expertise  
Audit committee members expertise refer to the knowledge, qualifications and experience 
a member possess. Audit committee members are classified as financial experts if they 
possess work experience in accounting or finance, hold a professional qualification or 
certification in accounting, or any experience that deals with sophisticated financial process 
(Felo & Solieri, 2009).  
 
Abbot et al. (2004) defined audit committee financial expert as those who are Certified 
Public Accountant (CPA), venture capitalist, investment banker, controller or Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO); while, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) defined financial expert as 
those who have direct accounting or finance background (CPA and ACCA), and experience 
as CEO, controller, or treasurer. DeFond, Hann and Hu (2005) classified audit committee 
financial experts into accounting experts, financial experts, non-accounting experts, and 
non-financial experts. They reported a positive market reaction occurs when an accounting 
expert is appointed to the audit committee, whereas no market reaction occurs when non-
accounting or non-financial expert is appointed. 
 
 Similarly, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) assorted audit committee expertise intro three 
main groups: 1) Financial experts are those with experience as auditor, CPA, CFO, Chief 
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Operating Officer (COO) or financial controller. 2) Non-accounting experts are those with 
experience as CEO. 3) Non-financial experts are those who do not fulfil conditions of 1 or 
2.  They report a positive relationship between accounting conservatism and companies that 
have experts (type 1) in their audit committee. In addition, Nelson and Devi (2013) divided 
expertise into four categories: 
1- The accounting expert, is a member with professional certification on accounting, and 
experience in a managerial position. 
2- The financial expert, is a member with professional certification on accounting, a 
postgraduate certification, and experience in a managerial position. The different 
between Type 1 and 2 is the inclusion of postgraduate qualification. 
3- The non-accounting professional expert, is a member which is part of a professional body 
in any field except accounting bodies, has a postgraduate certification, and experience in 
a managerial position. 
4- The non-accounting expert, is a person with postgraduate certification and managerial 
experience. Nelson and Devi (2013) reported the expectation of these experts to reduce 
the agency problem that occurs due to managers’ capability to manipulate earnings.  
 
2.4.1.1 Audit Committee Members Experience   
Audit committee members experience reflects the number of years a member has in the 
field of accounting, finance, auditing, or any other field. It is important for audit committee 
members to acquire certain skills and experience to be able to discharge their duties 
effectively. Financial experience and knowledge of audit committee members in auditing, 
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finance, or accounting is crucial due to the fact that most monitoring judgments are 
subjective, and those members will be a helpful hand to internal auditors (Mat Zain et al., 
2006). To be more precise, financial experts are more likely to ask the proper questions, 
thus able to detect any fraud or mis-information in the financial statements. Experienced 
committee is crucial as it adds credibility to the financial statements (Burrowes & 
Hendriks, 2005) and reviews the internal audit activities and programs (Read & 
Raghunandan, 2001).  
 
 Prior research explains the relationship between audit committee members experience and 
internal control. Zhang et al. (2007) and Hoitash et al. (2009) revealed the importance of 
having an accounting expert on the audit committee since it is related to lower internal 
control issues. Similarly, Naiker and Sharma (2009) found that audit committee members 
with auditing experience have the ability to decrease internal control issues more 
effectively.  
 
With regard to earnings management, Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt (2003); Bédard, Chtourou, 
& Courteau (2004); and Nelson and Devi (2013) reported that the existence of at least one 
member of the audit committee who has experience in auditing or accounting will defiantly 
lead to a decrease in the management earnings practices. Iyer, Bamber and Griffin (2012) 
found that experienced audit committee members in accounting or auditing are considered 
financial experts, therefore they contribute to limit earnings management.   Salleh and Haat 
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(2014) concluded a negative association between audit committee members with 
accounting experience and earnings management.  
 
Regarding earnings quality prior literature, Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein and Neal (2006) 
found that audit committee members with accounting or auditing experience increase 
earnings quality in a company. Their finding is in line with Baxter and Cotter (2009) study 
which concluded the positive relationship between experienced audit committee members 
and earnings quality. Similarly, Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2010) reported that audit 
committees which possess accounting expertise have a positive relationship with earnings 
quality; however, insignificant relationship between members experience in finance and 
supervisory with earnings quality. On the other hand, Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006); Lin, 
Li and Yang (2006) reported no relationship between audit committee members accounting 
and auditing experience and earning quality. Their findings revealed that those members 
fail to prevent earnings management and improve the quality of earnings.  
     
In internal audit function context, Alzeban (2015) found that the existence of accounting 
or auditing expertise in the audit committee is strongly associated with greater 
implementation of the suggestions and recommendations raised by internal auditors. 
Furthermore, Raghunandan, Read and Dasaratha (2001) reported that audit committees that 
comprise with a minimum of one member who possesses accounting or auditing experience 
are more likely to provide chief internal auditor (CIA) with private access to any necessary 
data, to review and understand the results and suggestions proposed by internal auditors 
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during their review, and to arrange longer meetings with the person in charge of internal 
audit function. 
 
In the context of audit report lag, Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010) study covered 628 companies 
listed on Bursa Malaysia in 2002 and reported a negative but insignificant relationship 
between audit committee members experience and audit report lag; However, Abernathy, 
Beyer, Masli and Stefaniak (2014) study covered U.S listed companies during the period 
2006-2008 and reported a significant and negative relationship between AC members 
accounting experience and audit delay if this experience was gained from public 
accounting works and not CFO experience. Regarding interaction between audit committee 
and internal audit, Goodwin (2003) suggested the existence of complementary impact of 
members accounting experience and independence on the relationship between audit 
committee and internal audit. While independence is related to process issues, accounting 
experience is related to the extent of reviews conducted by audit committee on internal 
auditors’ works.  
 
Audit committee members experience was examined in prior literature in the context of 
internal control, earnings management, earning quality, recommendations arise from the 
internal audit staff, CIA assistance, audit report lag, and interaction between audit 
committee and internal audit. It was also studied in the context of internal audit budget 




2.4.1.2 Audit Committee Members Qualifications   
Audit committee members qualifications refer to their academic qualification 
(undergraduate or postgraduate) and professional qualification such as being a member of 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), Certified Public Accountants 
(CPA) America, Certified Public Accountants (CPA) Australia, Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants (MIA), Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA) or 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). It is also significant 
for audit committee members to possess certain academic and professional qualifications 
to be able to discharge their duties effectively. Bursa Malaysia requires at least one member 
of the audit committee to be a member of the MIA or to have a professional qualification 
in the area of accounting or auditing such as ACCA or CPA qualifications. Part of the vital 
factors of audit committee members to be expert are certified accountants and 
professionally qualified because these characteristics are important to boost the committee 
effectiveness (Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, 2002) 
 
 It is commonly known that the quality of financial reporting is better when the committee 
includes a financial expert (McDaniel, Martin, & Maines, 2002). Companies with financial 
issues usually do not have financial expertise in their audit committees, so the open market 
reacts in a positive way when a qualified or certified accountant is appointed to the 
committee (Davidson, Xie, & Xu, 2004). Audit committee expertise contribute to less 
intentional errors and unintentional mistakes in accounts (Dhaliwal et al., 2010), minimize 
audit effort and risks (Yatim et al., 2006) and mitigate auditor-client disputes (Salleh & 
Stewart, 2012).    
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DeZoort and Salterio (2001) found that qualified members are capable of understanding 
risks external auditors are willing to undertake. Thus, increasing the probability that 
external auditor would adopt the works performed by internal auditors (Mat Zain et al., 
2006). Adel and Maisaa (2013) reported a positive impact of audit committee members 
knowledge on interaction between internal audit and audit committee. According to Saleh, 
Iskandar and Rahmat (2007); Badolato, Donalson and Ege (2014), knowledgeable 
committee in accounting, finance or auditing supports in reducing earnings management 
practices as a proxy of abnormal accruals. Regarding audit committee diligence, Maraghni 
and Nekhili (2014) reported that member competence measured as level of education 
reinforces audit committee diligence through members’ attendance and number of 
meetings.  
 
In the context of financial reports restatements, Abbott, Parker and Peters (2004); Agrawal 
and Chadha (2005); Huang and Thiruvadi (2010); Wan-Mohammad, Wasiuzzaman, 
Morsali and Zaini (2018) found that audit committee which includes at least one person 
who possesses academic or professional qualification in accounting or auditing is 
negatively and significantly related with the financial reports restatements. Their studies 
elaborate that those members have the ability to understand and recognize the financial 
statements, auditing issues and risks, and then provide recommendations to override these 
issues and risks. Sharma and Iselin (2012); Dhaliwal et al. (2010) found audit committee 
members expertise who are independent are associated with less financial reporting 
misstatements. However, Lin et al. (2006) found no association between AC members 
qualifications and financial reporting restatements. A possible reason for this finding is the 
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study has been examined on 2000 (before the establishment of SOX act). Another possible 
reason is the small volume of sample size that covered only 106 companies in the U.S over 
one year.     
 
In the context of external audit fees, Abbott et al. (2003); Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) 
documented audit committee that encompasses of one member who has qualifications in 
accounting or auditing relates positively with external audit fees. One possible reason is 
requesting more assurance which leads to more audit fees. Likewise, Yatim et al. (2006) 
found a significant and positive relationship between audit fees and committee member 
with accounting affiliation. In addition, Yasin and Nelson (2012) reported a positive 
relationship between external audit fees and audit committee members who possess 
postgraduate qualification. 
 
 With regard to audit report lag, Salleh et al. (2017) found no significant relationship 
between audit report lag and audit committee members academic or professional 
qualifications. They claimed that committee expertise has a relationship with shorter audit 
report lag if accompanied with audit committee independence. Prior research also finds a 
positive relationship between reducing misappropriation of assets and the existence of 
knowledgeable audit committee (Mustafa & Ben Youssef, 2010).  
 
Prior studies usually examine audit committee expertise in general with different variables 
mentioned above in this section. This study tries to link the factors of audit committee 
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members qualifications with internal audit budget. This can be looked at from two different 
perspectives. Audit committee members who possess accounting or auditing qualifications 
have more knowledge about internal control and risk management, so they require less 
assurance from internal audit department. As a result, it suggests that audit committee plays 
as a substitute mechanism for internal control aside with internal audit function. The other 
perspective looks at the other way, audit committee members with those qualifications 
require more assurance from internal audit department due to their desire to have better 
internal control. This perspective assume that audit committee members will be more 
cautious in overseeing the financial reporting process to safeguard their reputation.  
 
2.5 Underpinning Theory   
The theory used in the current study is the agency theory since it has the ability to foresee 
the effect of any changes in the organization on the effectiveness of internal audit (Adams, 
1994). 
2.5.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory explains the separation of ownership and control in an organization where 
the agents (managers) try to maximize their wealth and fulfil their interests against the 
interests of the owners (shareholders) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory also 
explains information asymmetry that exists because the owners do not have much access 
to the information needed to evaluate the managers duties (Evans & Weir, 1995). 
Therefore, the owners should guarantee that information asymmetry decreases and the 
conflict between agents and owners reduces as well (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In Malaysia, 
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the case is a bit different because the ownership structure is not dispersed as those in the 
U.S and the UK but it concentrated in the hands of founding families, banks, government 
institutions and major corporations (Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Claessens, Djannklov, & 
Lang, 2000). This concentrated ownership structure leads to tunneling which means 
majority shareholders dominate minority shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Schleifer, 2000). 
 
Prior researches clarified that corporate governance could be used to reduce agency 
problems and costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Akhtaruddin, Hossain, & Yao, 2009). Examples 
of the corporate governance that could be used within an organization is the internal audit 
function and audit committee. Both techniques are used to oversee the process of financial 
reporting which may result in reducing information asymmetry (Akhtaruddin, et al., 2009). 
Sarens and Abdolmohammadi (2011) argued that managers are willing to pay bonding 
costs (internal audit budget) to send a message to the shareholders that their work is aligned 
with owners’ interests.  
 
The potential correlation between audit committee expertise and investment in internal 
audit can be elaborated from substitution hypothesis perspective and complementary 
perspective. According to substitution hypothesis perspective, appointing an effective and 
efficient audit committee members will lead to better internal controls of the company, 
therefore, assurance needs by internal auditors will be reduced (Barua et al., 2010). On the 
other hand, complementary perspective argues that audit committee members use their 
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expertise to request more assurance from internal auditors which lead to more investment 
in internal audit function. Agency theory explains the need for both variables used in this 
study internal audit and audit committee expertise. Agency theory tries to minimize the 
conflict that rises between owners and managers by assigning audit committee and internal 
audit. The cost of both mechanisms increases the agency costs of terminating this conflict.     
 
2.6 Summary of the Chapter  
This chapter elaborates the concept of corporate governance and its importance to 
companies and countries in general. It also discusses the efforts performed by the 
Malaysian authorities towards corporate governance excellence and gain investors trust on 
the Malaysian capital markets. Then, this chapter provides literature review on audit 
committee members expertise and internal audit function. Moreover, it discusses the 
underlying theory that is related to this study to investigate the possible link between 











The main objective of this chapter is to explain the methods employed and carried out in 
this study. A proper methodology is essential for the reliable completion of the research 
paper. This chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 explains the research framework 
based on literature review conducted by the researcher. In section 3.3, hypotheses 
development is organized. Section 3.4 depicts research design. In section 3.5, the study 
provides how independent, dependent and control variables were assessed and measured. 
Section 3.6 depicts the research model, while section 3.7 explains the procedures of data 
collection that researcher used throughout the research. Section 3.8 describes the 
population and the way sample is selected. Section 3.9 discusses the procedures used to 
examine the hypotheses and this chapter is concluded with section 3.10.   
 
3.2 Research Framework 
The study’s framework and model were mainly developed based on prior studies and 
literature that examined internal audit budget such as Barua et al. (2010) and Al-Dhamari 
et al., (2018). It was built to show the link between independent variables which represent 
the characteristics of audit committee members expertise (experience and qualification) 
and dependent variable which is represented by internal audit budget. Furthermore, 
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determinants such as firm size, leverage, inventory intensity, Return on Assets (ROA), 
internal audit sources arrangement, audit committee size, external audit fees, size of audit 
firms, BOD size and BOD executive members are considered control variables in this 
study. The relationship between the DV and IVs is supported by the argument from agency 




















AC Members Expertise 
- Experience  
AC members accounting experience. 
AC members audit experience. 
AC members with prior Big Four 
experience. 
- Qualification  
AC members academic qualification.  
AC members professional qualification.  
 




Inventory intensity.  
Return on assets. 
Internal audit source arrangement 
Audit Committee size. 
External Audit fees. 
Size of audit firms. 
BOD size. 
BOD executive members. 
BOD size.  
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3.3 Hypotheses Development 
Various hypotheses have been developed to serve the objectives of this study. This study 
includes internal audit budget as dependent variable and AC members experience and 
qualifications as independent variables. 
 
3.3.1 Audit Committee Members Experience and Internal Audit budget. 
The accounting and auditing experience of audit committee members are important 
characteristics that impact the efficiency of AC in monitoring and controlling the financial 
reporting process. According to Baxter and Cotter (2009), AC members experience is 
considered a crucial factor of the effectiveness of audit committee operations. The 
existence of professionals in the AC supply customers with value by taking out deceptive 
activities form the corporation (Schmidt & Wilkins, 2012). In the U.S, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
act (2002) required all US listed firms to have at least one member who has financial 
reporting experience in the AC. 
 
Prior literature documented that experienced audit committee members ensure a better 
earnings quality (e.g. Carcello et al., 2006; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2010), 
mitigate earnings management activities (e.g. Xie et al., 2003; Bédard et al., 2004; Iyer et 
al., 2012; Nelson & Devi, 2013; Salleh & Haat, 2014), decrease internal control issues (e.g. 
Zhang et al., 2007; Hoitash et al., 2009; Naiker & Sharma, 2009), and shorten audit report 
lag (e.g. Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010; Abernathy et al., 2014). These results support agency 
theory arguments that explains the importance of an experienced audit committee member 
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to minimize the conflict that rises between agents and principles through ensuring the 
credibility and trustworthiness of financial reports and ensuring that internal and external 
auditors are performing in-line with the owners’ interests.    
 
Consequently, two competing perspectives explain the relationship between audit 
committee members experience and investment in internal audit function. The first one 
argues that experienced audit committee members in accounting or auditing, to have their 
reputation protected, are more careful in safeguarding the process of financial reporting 
(Persons, 2009). Audit committee members with accounting or auditing experience have a 
better understanding of accounting issues and they have a better ability to reveal 
management errors and frauds which might lead to additional work for the internal auditors 
(Barua et al., 2010). Prior literature proves that AC with accounting or auditing experience 
are more likely to produce more audit quality which results in more internal audit budget 
(Abbot el al., 2003; Carcello et al., 2006; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006; Vafeas & 
Waegelein, 2007; Dhaliwal et al., 2010;). Therefore, there is a positive correlation between 
audit committee members experience and investment in internal audit.  
 
The second perspective argues that the existence of accounting or auditing experts in AC 
develops the internal control system effectiveness and financial report quality which lead 
to reducing the need for additional works done by internal audit department. Zhang et al. 
(2007), Hoitash et al. (2009) and Naiker and Sharma (2009) found that audit committee 
members with auditing experience have the ability to decrease internal control issues more 
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effectively. Furthermore, Barua et al. (2010) study showed that audit committee members 
experience leads to a decrease in internal audit budget. Since there are two competing 
perspectives regarding AC members experience, this paper states non-directional 
hypotheses:   
Ha1: There is a significant relationship between AC experience in accounting and internal 
audit budget. 
Ha2: There is a significant relationship between AC experience in audit and internal audit 
budget. 
Ha3: There is a significant relationship between AC members who have worked at BIG 
Four and internal audit budget. 
 
3.3.2 Audit Committee Members Qualifications and Internal Audit budget. 
To have an effective financial reporting process, AC members with academic and 
professional qualifications are considered important for the company. Bursa Malaysia 
required at least one member of the audit committee to be a member of the Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants (MIA) or to have a professional qualification in the area of 
accounting or auditing such as ACCA and CPA qualifications. There is an argument among 
researchers that investors tend to be attracted towards companies that have many experts 
in the audit committee. This is because qualified members have the ability to understand 
and recognize the usage of generally accepted accounting standards and scrutinize financial 




Persons (2009) study showed that those AC independent members with a background in 
accounting or auditing can discover financial reports mistakes and any manipulations done 
by the management to satisfy their own code of ethics and safeguard their reputation. Prior 
literature documented that qualified audit committee members mitigate earnings 
management (e.g. Saleh et al., 2007; Badolato et al., 2014) reduce the incident of financial 
report restatements (e.g. Abbott et al., 2004; Huang & Thiruvadi, 2010; Wan-Mohammad 
et al., 2018) and minimize misappropriation of assets (e.g. Mustafa & Ben Youssef, 2010) 
 
There are two different viewpoints that explain the relationship between AC members 
qualifications and internal audit budget since these qualifications might impact the number 
of resources available for internal audit function. The first viewpoint argues that those 
members are more likely to require internal auditors to perform additional works in order 
to provide more assurance about the financial reports. Abbott et al. (2003); Vafeas and 
Waegelein (2007) found that audit committee that encompasses of one member who has 
qualifications in accounting or auditing relates positively with audit fees. One possible 
reason is the asking for more assurance which leads to more audit fees. In addition, Yasin 
and Nelson (2012) found that a positive relationship exists between external audit fees and 
audit committee members who possess postgraduate qualification. Therefore, there is a 
positive correlation between audit committee members qualifications and investment in 




The other viewpoint argues that those members will most likely provide the company more 
assurance about their financial report process and they will reduce earnings management 
and increase earnings quality which may lead to lower internal audit budget. Naiker and 
Sharma (2009) and Zhang et al. (2007) found that audit committee members with 
accounting or auditing qualifications have the ability to decrease internal control issues 
more effectively. Furthermore, Barua et al. (2010) study showed that audit committee 
members qualifications lead to a decrease in internal audit budget. Since there are two 
competing viewpoints regarding AC members qualifications, the following non-directional 
hypotheses are stated:    
Ha4: There is a significant relationship between AC members academic qualification and 
internal audit budget. 
Ha5: There is a significant relationship between AC members professional qualification 
and internal audit budget.  
 
3.4 Research Design  
Data is collected from the annual reports of top 100 companies listed in Bursa Malaysia 
through the period of 2015-2017 and Datastream as well based on market capitalization. 
The collected data will be analyzed using the descriptive, correlation and regression 




3.5 Measurement of Variables  
Independent, dependent and control variables are measured as follows:  
 
3.5.1 Dependent Variable  
Internal Audit Budget (IAB) is measured by the cost and expenses paid to conduct 
internal audit function (Barua et al., 2010; Alzeban, 2015). 
 
3.5.2 Independent Variables 
3.5.2.1 Audit Committee Members Experience refers to members experience in different 
sectors that is considered important to internal audit function such as accounting, auditing, 
and prior BIG Four experience. 
 
Audit Committee Members Accounting Experience (ACACCEXP) is operationalized 
as the proportion of experienced audit committee members in accounting to the total 
number of audit committee members. AC members accounting experience includes 
working in accounting department, Chief Accounting Officer, CFOs, financial controller, 
etc. (Nelson & Devi, 2013; Maraghni & Nekhili, 2014).  
 
Audit Committee Members Auditing Experience (ACAUDEXP) is measured as the 
proportion of experienced audit committee members in auditing to the total number of audit 
committee members. AC members auditing experience encompasses the ability to prepare 
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financial statements and audit the records. It involves working as external auditor or 
internal auditor for a public accounting firm (Naiker & Sharma, 2009).  
 
Audit Committee Members with Prior BIG Four Experience (ACBG4EXP) is 
measured as the percentage of audit committee members who worked at BIG Four audit 
firms to the total number of audit committee members. The BIG Four audit firms are 
Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), KPMG & EY.    
 
3.5.2.2 Audit Committee Members Qualifications refer to members academic and 
professional qualifications in the areas of accounting, auditing or finance. 
Audit Committee Members Academic Qualification (ACAQ) is operationalized as the 
percentage of audit committee members possessing academic qualification (e.g. 
undergraduate of postgraduate) to the total number of audit committee members. (Yasin & 
Neslson, 2012; Maraghni & Nekhili, 2014). 
 
Audit Committee Members Professional Qualification (ACPQ) is assessed based on a 
proportion of audit committee members who possess professional qualification in 
accounting to the total number of audit committee members. Professional qualification 
includes possessing a certificate of (ACCA, CPA America, CPA Australia, etc.). It also 
includes being a member of a professional accounting or auditing body such as MIA, 
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MICPA, International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), ICAEW, ACCA, etc. (Yasin & 
Neslson, 2012). 
 
3.5.3 Control Variables: 
The current study includes firm size, leverage, inventory intensity, ROA, internal audit 
sources arrangement, audit committee size, external audit fees, Big Four- non-Big Four 
external auditor, BOD size and BOD executive members as control variables. These 
variables were proved to have significant influence on internal audit budget in prior studies 
(e.g. Al-Dhamari et al., 2018; Alzeban, 2015; Yasin & Neslson, 2012; Barua et al., 2010; 
Carcello, et al., 2005). This subsection provides a discussion on how to measure these 
variables.  
 
Firm Size (FSIZE) is assessed based on the book value of the company’s total assets. 
(Carcello et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2007; Abbott et al., 2010; Alzeban, 2015). The larger 
the company’s size, the more a company invests in internal audit function.  
 
Leverage (LVG) is assessed by dividing total debt by total assets (Jenkins, Kane, & 
Velury, 2006; Gul, Fung, & Jaggi, 2009). Previous literature found that a higher proportion 
of debt leads to investing more in internal audit (Carcello et al., 2005). Therefore, there is 




Inventory Intensity (INVINT) is measured using the ratio of total inventory to total 
current assets (Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006). This ratio has been utilized to show the 
complexity of company’s operations (Abbot et al., 2010). It has been proved that a positive 
relationship between firm complexity and internal audit budget exists (Carcello et al., 
2005). 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) is operationalized using the ratio of Return on Assets (ROA). 
This ratio has been used to display the firm’s strength (Oussii & Taktak, 2018). It is 
assumed that stronger firms with higher ROA tend to invest more in internal audit. 
 
Internal Audit Source Arrangement (IASOUA) is measured using a dummy variable 
which 1 means IAF is being organized outsourced and 0 means IAF is being organized in-
house (Barua et al., 2010; Yasin & Neslson, 2012; Al-Dhamari et al., 2018). Previous 
literature showed that outsourced internal audit has a negative relationship with internal 
audit budget (Carcello et al., 2005; Barua et al., 2010). Outsourced internal audit provides 
a more independent internal audit function with less costs.     
 
Audit Committee Size (ACSZE) is measured by the audit committee members number 
(Klein, 2002; Zhang et al., 2007; Adel & Maisaa, 2013; Al-Dhamari et al., 2018). Al-




External Audit Fees (EAF) is measured by the cost paid to conduct external audit function 
(Barua et al., 2010). The more a company invests in external audit, the less it invests in 
internal audit function.  
 
Size of Audit Firms (SZEA) is operationalized by using a dummy variable where it takes 
a value of 1 if the firm’s external auditor is one of the BIG Four and the value of 0 otherwise 
(Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006). BIG Four audit firms provide a high quality of audit 
function. They also help to develop a firm’s internal control and financial reporting process 
(Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006). Therefore, this study expects a negative relationship 
between using one of the BIG Four audit firms and investment in internal audit.  
 
Board of Directors Size (BODSZE) is measured by the number of board of director’s 
members (Nelson & Devi, 2013). A greater size of BOD provides better controlling and 
oversight over the management which leads to more internal audit works (Stewart & 
Munro, 2007). Therefore, a positive relationship between BOD size and internal audit 
budget is expected.  
 
Board of Directors Executive Members (BODEXC) is measured as percentage of 
executive members of the BOD to the total number of BOD (Nelson & Devi, 2013). This 




3.6 Operational Model 
Multiple regression analysis is used to examine the relationship between audit committee 
members expertise (experience and qualification) and internal audit budget. The Following 
model represents the operational model of this study: 
IAB= β 0 + β1 ACACCEXP + β2 ACAUDEXP + β3 ACBG4EXP + β4 ACAQ + β5 ACPQ 
+ β6 FSIZE + β7 LVG + β8 INVINT + β9 ROA + β10 IASOUA + β11 ACSZE + β12 EAF 
+ β13 SZEA + β14 BODSZE + β15 BODEXC + ε   
 Table 3.1 summarizes the variables used in this study and how each variable is measured.  
Table 3.1 
 Summary of the Variables Measurements Used in This Study 
























































The cost to conduct 





The proportion of 
experienced audit 
committee members in 
accounting to the total 
number of audit 
committee members.  
 
The proportion of 
experienced audit 
committee members in 
auditing to the total 
number of audit 
committee members.  
 
The proportion of audit 
committee members who 
have worked with BIG 
Four audit firms to the 
total number of audit 



















































































































































The proportion of audit 
committee members who 
possess academic 
qualification in 
accounting to the total 
number of audit 
committee members.  
 
The proportion of audit 
committee members who 
possess professional 
qualification in 
accounting to the total 
number of audit 
committee members.  
 
The book value of the 
company’s total assets. 
 
Dividing total debt by 
total assets. 
 
Total inventory to total 
current assets. 
 
Return on Assets 
 
Dummy with a value of 1 







The cost to conduct 
external audit function. 
 
Dummy with a value of 1 
if external auditor is one 
of the BIG Four, 
otherwise 0. 
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BODEXC Percentage of executive 
directors to the total 









3.7 Data Collection 
Secondary data were used to conduct this study. Annual reports of public listed firms in 
Bursa Malaysia were used to extract data concerning internal audit, audit committee, 
external audit and board of director variables. Internal audit data were found under Internal 
Audit Function section in annual reports. AC variables data were found under board of 
directors’ profile. External audit fees were extracted from the financial statements notes, 
while size of audit firm data was found at corporate information section. BOD data were 
found at corporate information and BOD’s profile sections. Other financial data such as 
leverage, inventory intensity, firm size and ROA was extracted from Datastream. 
Datastream is a financial database that provides ready financial data of listed companies 
worldwide including Malaysia.    
 
3.8 Sample of Study 
3.8.1 Population 
The targeted population is Malaysian listed companies in Bursa Malaysia based on 2017 
market capitalization. According to Bursa Malaysia website, the number of Malaysian 
listed companies in Bursa Malaysia is 924 company. The target population is tested over 
three-years period – from 2015 to 2017. 
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3.8.2 Sample Size and Period of Study 
The sample of this study includes the top 100 firms listed in Bursa Malaysia based on 2017 
market capitalization over three-years period – from 2015 to 2017-. The top 100 companies 
were selected after extracting financial companies, real estate investment trust companies 
and newly listed companies. The reason for starting on 2015 was due to the consideration 
that it is a recent year after the establishment of MCCG (2012) with its suggestions for 
audit committees in companies. 2017 was the end year because it is the latest year with 
available published data and annual reports on Bursa Malaysia. Moreover, it is the year 
after establishing the newly reviewed MCCG (2017). 
 
The author selected the top 100 companies because they are more likely to provide 
sufficient data on audit committee and internal audit. The companies have well established 
internal audit and AC functions. Financial companies which include banks, insurance 
companies, investment funds, stock brokerages and consumer-finance companies were 
excluded since they have different corporate governance rules and procedures regarding to 
internal audit and audit committee. Real Estate Investment Trust (REITs) companies were 
also extracted since they have similar characteristics to financial companies. Companies 
that have incomplete annual reports, missing data, or their financial year is longer than 12 




3.9 Data Analysis  
 The main purpose of the current paper is to study the relationship between audit committee 
members expertise and internal audit budget. To investigate the hypothesized association, 
the study utilized various statistical tests. First, the descriptive statistics analysis 
(minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation) is performed to depict the 
characteristics of the sample under study. Second, this study conducts assumption tests to 
give insight about normality, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity of data. Third, 
correlation analysis was performed to figure out which variable has a strong or weak 
correlation with the dependent variable and to figure out the multicollinearity among 
control and independent variables. Finally, this study uses multiple regression analysis to 
examine the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Data is 
processed and analyzed using Stata software. 
 
3.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides the study’s framework which explains the developed hypotheses to 
test the relationship between audit committee members expertise and internal audit budget. 
Five hypotheses were developed to fulfil the needs to study this highly significant 
association. Then, this chapter briefly depicts how each variable (dependent, independent 
and control) is measured. The chapter also explains research design, data collection 
procedure, population and the sample of the study. Finally, it depicts the analysis 





RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a discussion and analysis on the findings of 
the study. The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reports the 
descriptive statistics of the variables. In section 4.3, model specification tests and 
diagnostic tests are presented. Section 4.4 presents, discusses and analyzes the main 
findings of this study. Section 4.5 provides additional tests to examine the robustness of 
the results and to make sure the main analysis has been carried out properly. Finally, section 
4.6 concludes.   
 
4.2 Descriptive Analysis  
Descriptive statistics provides real information about each variable tested in the current 
study. One main advantage of descriptive analysis is enabling the researcher to comprehend 
the data and to profile it accordingly. Table 4.1 depicts the sample firms after classifying 
them to different sectors based on Bursa Malaysia categorization. Trading and services 
sector represents the highest ratio among the sectors tested with a percentage of 36%. 





 Table 4.1 
Sample Companies After Bursa Malaysia Sector Classification 







































Total 100 300 100% 
 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Notes: IAB: the cost to conduct internal audit function, ACACCEXP: the proportion of 
experienced audit committee members in accounting, ACAUDEXP: the proportion of 
experienced audit committee members in auditing, ACBG4EXP: the proportion of audit 
committee members who have worked with BIG Four audit firms, ACAQ: the proportion 
of audit committee members who possess academic qualification in accounting, ACPQ: 
the proportion of audit committee members who possess professional qualification in 
accounting, FSIZE: the book value of the company’s total assets, LVG: dividing total debt 
by total assets, INVINT: total inventory to total current assets, ROA: return on assets, 
IASOUA: 1 if outsourced and 0 if in-house, ACSZE: audit committee members number, 
Variable Mean Sd Min Max Median 
IAB  2,607,697 4,927,252 7,500 44,200,000 1,058,038 
ACACCEXP 0.296 0.214 0 0.750 0.333 
ACAUDEXP 0.214 0.224 0 1 0.250 
ACBG4EXP 0.181 0.187 0 0.667 0.200 
ACAQ 0.194 0.203 0 0.750 0.225 
ACPQ 0.388 0.185 0 1 0.333 
FSIZE 
(RM’000) 
13,293,609 13,293,610 158,406 1,144,208,900 4,381,369 
LVG (%) 25.544 16.991 0 68.500 26.970 
INVINT (%) 22.255 19.069 0 78.480 19.615 
ROA (%) 8.937 9.899 -17.440 75.320 6.125 
IASOUA 0.157 0.364 0 1 0 
ACSZE 3.510 0.667 3 5 3 
EAF  1,378,797 1,617,555 63,500 10,029,000 733,500 
SZEA 0.853 0.354 0 1 1 
BODSZE 8.923 1.943 5 15 9 
BODEXC 0.279 0.187 0 0.820 0.250 
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EAF: the cost paid to external auditor for statutory audit, SZEA:  1 if external auditor is 
one of the BIG Four, otherwise 0, BODSZE: BOD members number, BODEXC: 
percentage of executive directors. 
 
Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables examined in the current study. 
Internal audit budget shows a minimum (min) of Malaysian Ringgit (RM) 7,500, a 
maximum (max) of (RM) 44,200,000 and a mean of (RM) 2,607,697. The average value 
of audit committee accounting experience (ACACCEXP) is 30% meaning that 1/3 of audit 
committee members are accounting experienced and the max is 75% of audit committee. 
Audit committee auditing experience (ACAUDEXP) has a max of 100% and a mean of 
21%, indicating that some companies have full committee with auditing experience and 
almost 1/5 of audit committee members have auditing experience. Barua et al. (2010) study 
descriptive analysis shows that 14% of audit committee members have auditing experience. 
 
Moreover, table 4.2 shows that Audit committee members who possess BIG Four 
experience (ACBG4EXP) have a max of 67% and almost 1/5 of audit committee members 
have worked at BIG Four audit firms. Audit committee members academic qualification 
(ACAQ) represents almost 20% of audit committees, while audit committee members 
professional qualification (ACPQ) represents 39% of audit committees. In this context, Al-
Dhamari et al. (2018) descriptive statistics reveals that 33% of audit committee members 
have qualifications. The descriptive analysis shows that ACACCEXP, ACAUDEXP, 
ACBG4EXP, ACAQ and ACPQ have a min of 0% indicating that some companies have 




For control variables, table 4.2 shows the mean of firm’s size (FSIZE) as almost RM 13.3 
billion and a min (max) of RM 158 (1,144,209) million. Leverage, measured as total debt 
to total assets, has a mean of 25.54% and ranges between 0% and 68.5%. The min (max) 
of inventory intensiveness (INVINT) is 0% (78.48%) with an average of 22.26%. Return 
on assets (ROA) has an average of 8.94% with a min of -17.44% and a max of 75.32%. 
Internal audit source arrangement (IASOUA) is 16% outsourced and 84% is performed in-
house. Barua et al. (2010) found 14% of companies outsource internal audit function to a 
third party. The results suggest that most companies have developed their own internal 
audit department perhaps to keep secret information within the company. The average 
number of audit committee size (ACSZE) is approximately 4 members and a range of 3 
and 5 members. Similarly, Alzeban and Sawan (2015) found the average of audit 
committee size to be 4 members. 
 
External audit fees (EAF) ranges between RM 63,500 and RM 10,029,000, the mean is 
RM 1,378,797. The average of companies that uses BIG Four companies as represented by 
size of external auditor (SZEA) is approximately 85%. The results suggest that most firms 
use BIG Four audit firms for external audit fees to ensure audit quality. Another reason is 
due to the sample of the study that consists of the top 100 companies which preferably 
employ big audit firms. Board of directors contains of a min of 5 members and a max of 
15 members, the mean is nearly 9 members. Wan-Mohammad et al. (2018) found the 
average of board of director’s members to be 8 members which is close to the value 
presented by the current study. Finally, the average of executive members of board of 
directors (BODEXC) is 28% with a min of 0% and a max of 82%.  
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4.3 Diagnostic Tests 
Diagnostic tests are usually performed before coming up to the main analysis to ensure 
valid results and avoid deluded findings. This section begins with diagnostic tests that are 
related to distribution of data such as normality and multicollinearity. Then, this section 
provides model specification tests to choose between Pooled ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression, random effects or fixed effects. Finally, this section provides diagnostic tests 
that are related to the panel data of this study such as heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation 
and cross-sectional dependency.  
 
4.3.1 Data Distribution Diagnostic Tests 
4.3.1.1 Normality 
Normality refers to the way data is distributed. Normality is not important for the 
estimation of regression coefficients; however, it is mandatory to be carried out for 
hypothesis testing (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2013). There are various methods that 
could be employed to check data normality such as Kamagorov-Smiron, Shapiro-Francia 
and Shapiro-Wilk tests. The current study uses Kamagorov-Smiron test by obtaining 
skewness and kurtosis values to test for normality. According to Kline (2011), skewness 
values should be less than 3, while kurtosis should not exceed 10. Table 4.3 displays the 






Results of Normality Test 
 
Notes: please see Table 4.2 For variable definitions. 
 
IAB, FSIZE, ROA and EAF reported high values of skewness and kurtosis. As a result, 
this study transforms IAB, FSIZE and EAF to natural logarithm (log) to reduce normality 
issue. Furthermore, the current study winsorizes ROA to normalize it. It can be noticed 
from Table 4.3 that all variables have a skewness value between 3 and -3, and a kurtosis 
value between 10 and -10 which indicates all variables are normally distributed. Table 4.4 
displays the descriptive analysis of the modified variables.  
Table 4.4 
Descriptive Statistics of Modified Variables 
Variables Skewness Kurtosis 
IAB -0.382 3.092 
ACACCEXP 0.247 2.507 
ACAUDEXP 0.752 2.929 
ACBG4EXP 0.575 2.525 
ACAQ 0.639 2.552 
ACPQ 0.820 3.975 
FSIZE 0.076 2.508 
LVG 0.248 2.141 
INVINT 0.656 2.552 
ROA 1.488 6.115 
IASOUA 1.889 4.569 
ACSZE 0.946 2.720 
EAF 0.112 2.334 
SZEA -1.998 4.990 
BODSZE 0.426 2.639 
BODEXC 0.522 2.442 
Variable Mean Sd Min Max Median 
LOGIAB 13.77448 1.540 8.923 17.604 13.872 
















Multicollinearity refers to the problem of high correlation among independent and control 
variables that would mislead the regression results. The existence of multicollinearity in a 
model tends to reduce the reliability of regression findings (Hair et al., 2013). Two main 
techniques are employed in the current study to test multicollinearity: correlation matrix 
and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). It is commonly argued that performing one of these 
tests to check for multicollinearity is not enough, so it is important to carry out both tests 
(Hamilton, 2012). The problem of multicollinearity exists when the value of VIF of each 
variable is more than 10 (Hair et al., 2013).  Table 4.5 displays the results of VIF test. 
Table 4.5 
Results of VIF Test 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
ACACCEXP 1.270 0.786 
ACAUDEXP 1.580 0.632 
ACBG4EXP 1.180 0.849 
ACAQ 1.220 0.818 
ACPQ 1.880 0.533 
FSIZE 3.680 0.272 
LVG 1.340 0.745 
INVINT 1.090 0.914 
ROA 1.590 0.630 
IASOUA 1.420 0.705 
ACSZE 1.320 0.757 
EAF 3.420 0.292 
SZEA 1.240 0.810 
BODSZE 1.300 0.770 
BODEXC 1.390 0.717 
Mean VIF 1.660 
 
Note: FSIZE: the natural log of company’s total assets, ROA: return on assets after 
winsorizing, EAF: the natural logarithm of external audit fees. Other variables are 




The results of Table 4.5 show no variable with a score of 10 or more, indicating the absence 
of multicollinearity issue. The highest VIF score is 3.68 for firm size (FSIZE) and the next 
highest goes for external audit fees (EAF) with a VIF value of 3.42.  
 
In addition, to provide assertions to the results provided by VIF test, the current study 
employs correlation matrix to test for multicollinearity as well. Two correlation matrixes 
were carried out: namely Pearson test and Spearman test. The problem of multicollinearity 
in the previous tests exist when correlation between variables exceed 0.9 (Hair et al., 2013; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). Table 4.6 displays the results for Pearson test. The highest 
value goes for the correlation between firm size (FSIZE) and external audit fees (EAF) 
with a score of 0.810 and the second highest value goes for the correlation between internal 
audit budget (IAB) and Firm size (FSIZE) with a score of 0.756. All results are under the 
value of 0.9 which indicates the absence of multicollinearity. Table 4.7 depicts the results 
of Spearman test. All values are under the standard value of 0.9 which again indicates the 
absence of multicollinearity issue. However, further analysis will be performed to ensure 









Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Please refer to Table 4.2 and 4.5 for variables definitions.  
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
IAB (1) 1 
               
ACACCEXP (2) 0.212 1 
              
ACAUDEXP (3) -0.055 0.076 1 
             
ACBG4EXP (4) 0.026 0.018 0.034 1 
            
ACAQ (5) -0.048 0.319 0.019 0.134 1 
           
ACPQ (6) -0.017 0.239 0.561 0.280 0.197 1 
          
FSIZE (7) 0.756 0.093 -0.020 -0.032 0.018 0.018 1 
         
LVG (8) 0.218 0.129 -0.031 -0.056 0.043 -0.045 0.442 1 
        
INVINT (9) -0.161 -0.026 0.029 0.075 0.034 0.037 -0.102 -0.039 1 
       
ROA (10) -0.380 -0.045 0.008 0.074 -0.122 -0.020 -0.530 -0.364 -0.016 1 
      
IASOUA (11) -0.572 -0.080 -0.083 -0.009 0.036 -0.069 -0.427 -0.174 0.080 0.244 1 
     
ACSZE (12) 0.171 0.090 -0.131 -0.079 -0.043 -0.175 0.123 0.078 -0.218 0.007 -0.096 1 
    
EAF (13) 0.711 0.129 -0.064 0.081 -0.015 0.076 0.810 0.372 -0.071 -0.491 -0.404 0.003 1 
   
SZEA (14) 0.272 0.166 0.094 0.082 0.049 0.161 0.141 0.066 -0.045 -0.063 -0.288 0.035 0.154 1 
  
BODSZE (15) 0.188 0.177 0.000 -0.034 0.033 0.099 0.273 0.242 -0.007 -0.289 -0.044 0.239 0.188 0.003 1 
 




Spearman Correlation Matrix 
Please refer to Table 4.2 and 4.5 for variables definitions.  
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
IAB (1) 1                
ACACCEXP (2) 0.177 1               
ACAUDEXP (3) -0.073 0.068 1              
ACBG4EXP (4) 0.034 -0.017 -0.039 1             
ACAQ (5) -0.032 0.273 0.016 0.130 1            
ACPQ (6) -0.034 0.239 0.478 0.301 0.186 1           
FSIZE (7) 0.745 0.075 0.009 -0.043 0.005 0.042 1          
LVG (8) 0.216 0.130 0.010 -0.066 0.016 -0.028 0.472 1         
INVINT (9) -0.187 0.016 0.011 0.111 0.071 0.058 -0.090 -0.050 1        
ROA (10) -0.421 -0.048 0.040 0.053 -0.067 -0.051 -0.578 -0.423 -0.055 1       
IASOUA (11) -0.506 -0.089 -0.086 -0.008 0.001 -0.107 -0.423 -0.197 0.088 0.239 1      
ACSZE (12) 0.196 0.026 -0.110 -0.120 -0.066 -0.271 0.133 0.061 -0.196 0.043 -0.101 1     
EAF (13) 0.714 0.120 -0.033 0.068 -0.033 0.119 0.800 0.411 -0.037 -0.545 -0.402 0.017 1    
SZEA (14) 0.212 0.174 0.118 0.062 0.033 0.209 0.115 0.080 -0.059 -0.078 -0.288 0.048 0.157 1   
BODSZE (15) 0.142 0.172 0.019 -0.057 0.000 0.045 0.240 0.233 0.021 -0.253 -0.035 0.223 0.173 0.025 1  
BODEXC (16) -0.420 -0.065 -0.065 0.059 -0.016 0.018 -0.158 0.018 0.237 0.059 0.303 -0.327 -0.073 -0.319 -0.005 1 
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4.3.2 Model Specification Tests 
To choose the proper test for a model, different assumptions should be confirmed to 
generate correct outcomes. The selection of appropriate model mainly relies on various 
tests and assumptions (Baltagi, 2013). The current study employs panel data that could be 
analyzed in three different ways: namely, pooled OLS regression, fixed effects model and 
random effects model. Panel data enhances the quantity and quality of data and reinforce 
empirical analysis by combining cross-sections with time series. Pooled OLS regression is 
usually used when there are not significant temporal nor spatial effects (Stock & Watson, 
2010). Fixed effects model is emplyed where there are constant slopes with intercepts that 
differ according to cross-sectional (group) firms (Greene, 2012). Random effects model is 
a function of random error and a mean value (Greene, 2012). To choose the accurate model 
for the current study, various tests are carried out as follows. 
 
4.3.2.1 Choosing Between Pooled OLS Regression and Random Effect Model 
The first test to be carried out in order to choose the accurate model is Breusch–Pagan-
Lagrangian-Multiplier test for random effects (LM). This test helps in choosing between 
pooled OLS regression and random effect model. The null hypothesis in LM test is that 
differences across companies are zero which means there is not any variance among firms 
(no panel effect). If the p-value (Prob > chibar2) is larger than 0.05, then the null hypothesis 
is accepted, and pooled OLS regression should be employed. However, if the p-value (Prob 
> chibar2) is less than 0.05 then the null hypothesis is not supported, and random effect 
model should be used (Greene, 2012).  
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Table 4.8 represents the results of LM test indicating a significant p value (less than 0.05). 
The null hypothesis is rejected because there is an evidence of variances across firms. The 




Results of Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test 
 IAB 
Chibar2(01) 186.30 
Prob > chibar2 0.0000 
H0(null) Not supported 
 
4.3.2.2 Choosing Between Random Effect Model and Fixed Effect Model 
The proper examination to choose between fixed effects and random effects is the Hausman 
specification test. The null hypothesis states that the individual influences are not correlated 
with the other model’s regressors. If the p-value (Prob > chibar2) is larger than 0.05, then 
the null hypothesis is supported, and it is secure to employ random effect model. However, 
if the p-value (Prob > chi2) is smaller than 0.05 then the null hypothesis is rejected, and we 
should use fixed effect model (Stock & Watson, 2010; Greene, 2012). In Table 4.9, the 
outcome reveals a significant p value less than 0.05 level. The null hypothesis is not 
supported; therefore, the appropriate model to be utilized is fixed effect model (Gujarati, 
2015).    
Table 4.9 




H0(null) Not supported 
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4.3.3 Panel Data Related Diagnostic Tests 
4.3.3.1 Heteroscedasticity  
Heteroscedasticity refers to the issue that rises when the variance of error is not identically 
and independently spread across the tested observations. It occurs when there is an absence 
of difference for error terms of a regression model. The variance may be constant among 
cross-sectional observations in panel data; however, the difference may vary within 
observations through group of years which brings the problem of group-wise 
heteroscedasticity (Baum, 2001). Heteroscedasticity is examined in current study using 
group-wise heteroscedasticity test. The null hypothesis states that error terms variance is 
homogenous. A p-value smaller than 0.05 indicates the results reject the null hypothesis 
and the issue of heteroscedasticity exists, otherwise no heteroscedasticity can be found 
(Green, 2003).    
 
The results of the test in Table 4.10 show the existence of heteroscedasticity in the model 
which should be corrected. The p-value is less than 0.05, so the null hypothesis is not 
supported. If the problems of cross-dependence and autocorrelation do not exist, then 
heteroscedasticity can be amended by employing the White’s standard error.  
Table 4.10 
Results of Modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity 
  IAB 
Chi² 170000000 
P-Value 0.000 





High similarities among error components across time raise the issue of autocorrelation. 
One of the assumptions of regression model is that error terms of observations is not 
influenced nor correlated by other observations. It is natural for panel data analysis to have 
the issue of autocorrelation since it focuses on many years of the same observation 
(Wooldridge, 2010). The Wooldridge test is commonly used to carry out autocorrelation 
test in random and fixed-effect models that use panel data.  
 
The null hypothesis states that error terms are not correlated. A p-value greater than 0.05 
indicates the results support the null hypothesis and the issue of autocorrelation does not 
exist, otherwise autocorrelation can be found (Green, 2003). The outcome of Table 4.11 
confirms the existence of autocorrelation. The null hypothesis is not supported, and the p-
value is less than 0.05. Autocorrelation should be amended using various methods such as 
Newey-West standard or Rogers errors. However, these two tests cannot be carried out if 
cross-sectional dependence problem exists (Petersen, 2009).    
Table 4.11 




  IAB 
Chi² 7.960 
P-Value 0.0058     
H0(null) Not supported 
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4.3.3.3 Cross-Sectional Dependence 
Cross-sectional dependence is the issue of correlation among error terms across companies. 
Two main categories of cross-sectional dependence: the first one occurs when the company 
residuals correlates across years, and the second one exists when the residuals of a specific 
year correlate across companies (Petersen, 2009). Petersen (2009) added that economic and 
finance data usually have cross-sectional dependence because companies have similarities 
when compared to each other and a cross time. Failing to recognize the issue could yield 
over or underestimation of the coefficients.  
 
Pesaran’s test is the suitable test to examine the cross-sectional dependence problem of 
panel data (Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006). The outcome of Pesaran’s test confirms the existing 
of the problem but at the level of 0.1. The problem exists but at a weak surface. The p-
value is .079 which indicates cross-sectional dependence occurs and it is hard to ignore it 
even though it is higher than .05. The diagnostic tests asserted the presence of cross-
sectional dependence, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity in the model. To correct this 
issue, the study adopts Driscoll and Kraay’s standard errors based on Hoechle (2007) to 
solve the three problems. The adjusted Driscoll and Kraay’s standard errors can be used 
for balanced and unbalanced panel data and Pooled OLS regression and fixed effect model.   
 
4.4 Regression Analysis 
Driscoll and Kraay’s standard errors is the type of regression used in the current study. 
Regression analysis assists in predicting and explaining the relationship and the value of 
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the dependent variables based on the values of independent variables (Kleinbaum, Kupper, 
Nizam, & Rosenberg, 2013). First, the current study will display the results based on 
Pooled OLS regression to figure out the adjusted R² value. The results of pooled OLS 
regression are displayed on Table 4.12 below. Then, the fixed effect model will be 
presented to explain the main results of the study.  
Obviously, the adjusted R² is nearly 78%. The p value is significant since it shows the value 
of 0.000. The outcome of Table 4.11 displays that the independent variables and control 
variables are able to clarify 78% of the changes that occur to internal audit budget.  
 
Table 4.12 











  DV: IAB-  Drisc/Kraay 
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic P-Val 
ACACCEXP 1.140 14.110 0.000*** 
ACAUDEXP -0.090 -1.590      0.114 
ACBG4EXP 0.464 10.070 0.000*** 
ACAQ -0.577 -13.550 0.000*** 
ACPQ -0.735 -5.730 0.000*** 
FSIZE 0.540 24.790 0.000*** 
LVG -0.012 -4.980 0.000*** 
INVINT -0.002 -2.920 0.004*** 
PROF 0.001 0.130      0.897 
IASOUA -0.844 -43.220 0.000*** 
ACSZE -0.044 -1.900      0.060* 
EAF 0.371 15.810 0.000*** 
SZEA 0.116 14.120 0.000*** 
BODSZE 0.035 20.630 0.000*** 
BODEXC -2.040 -18.890 0.000*** 
Number of obs 300 




Note: IAB: the natural log of internal audit budget, FSIZE: the natural log of company’s 
total assets, ROA: return on assets after winsorizing, EAF: the natural logarithm of external 
audit fees. Other variables are previously defined. P value *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
  
Table 4.13 provides the suitable regression analysis for the study’s model after carrying 
out model specification tests and diagnostic tests. The p vale is significant (Prob > F = 
0.00) in the model indicating the overall regression analysis model suits the regression 
equation. 
Table 4.13 
Results of fixed-effects regression analysis with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
   DV: IAB - Drisc/Kraay 
Variable  Expected sign Coefficient t-statistic P-Val 
ACACCEXP ? 0.584 3.710      0.000*** 
ACAUDEXP ? -0.085 -1.170 0.243 
ACBG4EXP ? -0.374 -25.770       0.000*** 
ACAQ ? -0.258 -1.680   0.095* 
ACPQ ? 0.441 9.470       0.000*** 
FSIZE + 0.375 6.350       0.000*** 
LVG + 0.008 4.900       0.000*** 
INVINT + 0.014 6.180       0.000*** 
ROA + 0.018 4.830       0.000*** 
IASOUA - 0.404 -17.730       0.000*** 
ACSZE + -0.028 -1.910        0.058* 
EAF - -0.010 -0.320 0.750 
SZEA - 0.015 0.270 0.785 
BODSZE + 0.072 5.620       0.000*** 
BODEXC - -0.483 -3.240       0.002*** 
 Method Fixed-effects regression 
 Number of obs 300 
 F (15, 99) 9.580 
 Prob > F 0.000 
 Within R-squared 0.23 
Note: IAB: the natural log of internal audit budget, FSIZE: the natural log of company’s 
total assets, ROA: return on assets after winsorizing, EAF: the natural logarithm of external 




The outcome of the below table shows a positive and significant at the level of P<0.01 
relationship between ACACCEXP and internal audit budget. This is consistent with 
hypothesis Ha1 that states there is a significant relationship between AC experience in 
accounting and internal audit budget. This outcome suggests that companies with more 
experienced audit committee members in accounting invest more in internal audit function. 
This finding is coherent with the argument that experienced audit committee members in 
accounting, to have their reputation protected, are more careful in safeguarding the process 
of financial reporting, so they require more internal audit works which lead to investing 
more in internal audit function. 
 
Barua et al., (2010) found a positive but not significant relationship between ACACCEXP 
and internal audit budget. There are some reasons that could explain the different results. 
First, Barua et al., (2010) carried out their study prior to the financial crisis of 2008, the 
accountants’ behavior has changed more conservative throughout the years. Accountants 
– since they do not work at audit firms- usually require more audit works to make sure they 
are in the safe side and their reputation is not harmed. In addition, Barua et al., (2010) used 
a dummy variable to measure experienced accounting members, while the current study 
employs a percentage method. 
 
In addition, ACBG4EXP is negatively and significantly at the level of P<0.01 related to 
internal audit budget. Hypothesis Ha3 is supported by the results”. This outcome suggests 
that companies that acquire audit committee members who have worked at BIG Four audit 
firms invest less in internal audit function. This finding is consistent with the argument that 
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the existence of BIG Four experts in AC develops the internal control system effectiveness 
and financial report quality which lead to reducing the need for additional works done by 
internal audit department. 
 
Moreover, ACAQ is negatively and significantly at the level of p<0.1 related to internal 
audit budget. Hypothesis Ha4 was supported by the findings of the regression analysis.  
The result proposes that members academic qualification assists to reduce internal audit 
budget. This is in line with hypothesis Ha4 that proposes a significant relationship between 
both variables.   
 
Furthermore, the findings show a positive and significant at the level of P<0.01 relationship 
between ACPQ and investing in internal audit function. This is consistent with hypothesis 
Ha5 that states “there is a significant relationship between AC members professional 
qualifications and internal audit budget”. The results suggest that those members who 
acquire professional qualifications tend to prefer protecting their reputation, so they require 
addition works, hence more internal audit budget. Al-Dhamari et al. (2018) found a 
negative and non-significant relationship between internal audit budget and audit 
committee expertise. Al-Dhamari et al. (2018) measured audit committee expertise as those 
who have qualifications in accounting or auditing. The main reason for inconsistence 
results between the two studies is probably due to the method of measurement. The current 
study sperate qualifications into academic and professional qualifications, while Al-
Dhamari et al. (2018) combined both types together resulting in non-significant 
relationship.         
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However, the findings show a negative but not significant relationship between 
ACAUDEXP and internal audit budget. The finding is not consistent with hypothesis Ha2 
that anticipated a significant relationship between ACAUDEXP and internal audit budget.  
The results suggest that experienced audit committee members in auditing are less likely 
to have monitoring nor controlling role over internal audit resources which contradict with 
agency theory argument. Appointing expertise in audit committee would most likely lead 
to reduce agency problem and agency costs. Managers would appoint voluntarily 
experienced audit committee members to send a message to shareholders that financial 
statements are reliable and trustworthy. 
 
The previous result is not consistent with Barua et al., (2010) results who found a negative 
and significant relationship with internal audit budget. A possible explanation is due to the 
measurement method since the current study employs two types of auditing experience; 
namely auditing experience at BIG Four audit firms and auditing experience at other audit 
firms, whereas Barua et al., (2010) employed one single measurement for auditing 
experience. So, different types of auditing experience may lead to various outcomes. 
 
The results found a positive and significant impact of experienced audit committee 
members in accounting and professionally qualified members on internal audit budget. The 
findings suggest appointing those members lead to an increase on IAB, hence an increase 
in agency costs. In addition, the results suggest that audit committee members who have 
worked at BIG Four audit firms and those who possess academic qualifications have a 
negative and significant relationship on internal audit budget. It can be implied that 
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appointing those members to audit committee would not only assist to monitor internal 
audit resources, but to reduce those resources as well. It can also be implied that appointing 
those members would lead to reduce agency costs since internal audit budget will be 
minimized.  
 
In the context of audit quality, the results obtained suggest that the existence of audit 
committee members expertise is essential to ensure effective financial reporting process. 
Therefore, appointing expertise to the audit committee gives rise to better audit quality due 
to their experience, knowledge and qualifications whereby companies are capable to 
exploit useful resources. Those members who have auditing experience, especially at BIG 
Four audit firms tend to use their knowledge and expertise to increase audit quality. It is 
not surprising that the findings of the current study show a negative relationship with 
internal audit budget because they use their own experience to reduce works performed by 
internal auditors. Similarly, having those members in audit committees would assist 
external auditors since they understand the way auditors operate, hence audit quality would 
increase.    
 
Apparently, most of the control variables have a significant effect on internal audit budget 
and most of them have the expected sign. For instance, firm’s size has a positive and 
significant relationship with internal audit budget. The results propose that the larger the 
company, the more it invests in internal audit function. In addition, leverage has a 
significant and positive relationship with IAB indicating a higher proportion of debt leads 
to investing more in internal audit. Furthermore, inventory intensity has a positive and 
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significant relationship with IAB. The results suggest the more complex the company, the 
more internal audit budget it pays. Similarly, Barua et al. (2010) found a positive and 
significant relationship between firm size, leverage and inventory intensity as control 
variables and internal audit budget as dependent variable.  Moreover, the findings show a 
positive and significant relationship between ROA and IAB indicating the more profits a 
company makes, the more it has the ability to invest in internal audit function. The findings 
also reveal a negative and significant relationship between internal audit source 
arrangement and IAB. This is consistent with Al-Dhamari et al. (2018) findings. The results 
suggest that outsourced internal audit provides a more independent internal audit function 
with less costs.       
 
Audit committee size has a negative and weak significance relationship with internal audit 
budget. This is not in line with the expected sign. A possible reason is larger audit 
committee provides expertise to the committee which requires less works done by the 
internal audit department, hence reducing internal audit budget. In addition, EAF has a 
negative relationship as expected with IAB but insignificant. Size of external auditor has a 
positive and insignificant relationship with IAB. The results propose if the external auditor 
is one of the BIG Four, internal audit budget will be larger. This result indicates that BIG 
Four audit firms rely on the internal audit department results if they found enough resources 
were contributed to internal audit function. 
 
BODSZE has a positive and significant relationship with IAB. The larger the BOD, the 
more it invests in internal audit function. Finally, BODEXC has a negative and significant 
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relationship with IAB. The results suggest the more executive members in the BOD, the 
less resources invested in internal audit function. 
 
4.5 Sensitivity Tests 
Sensitivity tests are robustness test of the main regression analysis of the study to ensure 
the validity and trustworthiness of the results. Two tests were carried out for this purpose. 
The first sensitivity test was conducted after re-measuring ACAUDEXP. Audit committee 
members auditing experience was measured as the percentage of experienced audit 
committee members in auditing to the total number of AC. The main analysis outcome 
showed a negative and non-significant relationship between ACAUDEXP and IAB. As an 
alternative measurement to ACAUDEXP, the regression model was re-run with 
independent variable ACAUDEXP, measured as the dummy variable taking the value of 1 
if audit committee has at least one member with auditing experience and 0 otherwise. Table 
4.14 displays the outcome of the re-evaluated model.  
 
The findings reported in the below table generally supports the results shown in table 4.13. 
For instance, ACACCEXP and ACPQ have a positive and significant impact on internal 
audit budget, while ACBG4EXP and ACAQ have negative and significant effect on 
investment in internal audit. The results also show a negative and non-significant 
relationship between ACAUDEXP and internal audit budget. The only difference between 
both analysis regarding the relationship between independent and dependent variable is the 
level of significant for the independent variable (ACAQ). In the main analysis, it was 
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significant at the level of 0.1, while it is significant here at the level of .05. So, the level of 
significance increased. The overall results suggest that the findings of the study remain 
unchanged despite employing the new measurement of ACAUDEXP.    
 
Table 4.14 
Results of regression analysis with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors employing alternative 
measurement of audit committee auditing experience 
  DV: IAB - Drisc/Kraay 
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic P-Val 
ACACCEXP 0.565 4.000 0.000*** 
ACAUDEXP -0.086 -1.010      0.315 
ACBG4EXP -0.368 -17.990 0.000*** 
ACAQ -0.222 -2.360      0.020** 
ACPQ 0.454 6.070 0.000*** 
FSIZE 0.380 6.640 0.000*** 
LVG 0.008 5.180 0.000*** 
INVINT 0.014 6.020 0.000*** 
PROF 0.019 5.260 0.000*** 
EAF -0.019 -0.550      0.587 
IASOUA -0.395 -16.390 0.000*** 
ACSZE -0.022 -1.130      0.261 
SZEA 0.015 0.280      0.781 
BODSZE 0.070 6.830 0.000*** 
BODEXC -0.477 -3.330 0.001*** 
Method  Fixed-effects regression  
Number of obs 300 
F (15, 99)   12.64 
Prob > F     0.000 
Within R-squared 0.23 
 Note: IAB: the natural log of internal audit budget, ACAUDEXP, 1 if consists of at least 
of experience member in auditing, 0 otherwise, FSIZE: the natural log of company’s total 
assets, ROA: return on assets after winsorizing, EAF: the natural logarithm of external 








Results of regression analysis with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors after removing EAF 
  DV: IAB - Drisc/Kraay 
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic P-Val 
ACACCEXP 0.585 3.610 0.000*** 
ACAUDEXP -0.082 -1.080      0.285 
ACBG4EXP -0.375 -35.400 0.000*** 
ACAQ -0.257 -1.710      0.091* 
ACPQ 0.439 9.880 0.000*** 
FSIZE 0.371 5.230 0.000*** 
LVG 0.008 4.920 0.000*** 
INVINT 0.014 6.200 0.000*** 
PROF 0.018 4.820 0.000*** 
IASOUA -0.406 -21.800 0.000*** 
ACSZE -0.027 -1.700      0.093* 
SZEA 0.015 0.300      0.768 
BODSZE 0.072 5.660 0.000*** 
BODEXC -0.479 -3.170 0.002*** 
Method  Fixed-effects regression  
Number of obs 300 
F (15, 99)   9.69 
Prob > F     0.000 
Within R-squared 0.229 
Note: IAB: the natural log of internal audit budget, FSIZE: the natural log of company’s 
total assets, ROA: return on assets after winsorizing, EAF: deleted. Other variables are 
previously defined. P value *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The second sensitivity test was carried out after removing external audit fees (EAF) as a 
control variable. The reason for taking out this control variable is due to the high value of 
correlation between EAF and IAB as found by the correlation matrix on Table 4.6 and 
Table4.7. It was found 0.711 and 0.714 in both tables respectively. Table 4.15 shows the 
results of the sensitivity test after removing EAF which are relatively similar to the one 
presented in the main analysis in Table 4.13. It can be concluded that multicollinearity does 
not affect the overall results of the study, and external governance mechanisms such as 
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external audit function are not much affected by internal governance mechanisms such as 
internal audit.  
 
4.6 Chapter Summary  
This chapter provided a descriptive statistic of the variables tested in the current study. 
Diagnostic tests and model specification tests were performed to ensure selecting the 
accurate regression model. Regression analysis with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors under 
fixed effects model was found the suitable test to examine the proposed relationships. The 
regression findings show that ACACCEXP and ACPQ have a positive and significant 
impact on internal audit budget, while ACBG4EXP and ACAQ have negative and 
significant effect on investment in internal audit. The results also show a negative and non-
significant relationship between ACAUDEXP and internal audit budget. Finally, two 
additional sensitivity tests were carried out to ensure the robustness of the findings resulting 
in the same outcome as presented by the main analysis. 








CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an overall conclusion about the whole study. 
Section 5.2 summarizes the study’s findings and whether hypotheses were supported or 
rejected. Section 5.3 provides the regulatory, theoretical and practical implications of the 
research results. In section 5.4, the limitation of the study was addressed. Section 5.5 
discusses possible paths for future research. Section 5.6 concludes.  
 
5.2 Study Overview  
Corporate accounting scandals such as Enron and Tyco reduced the confidence of investors 
in capital markets and involved audit firms. As a result, calls have been made towards the 
role of corporate governance as a way to regain investors’ trust. Two main mechanism that 
have been used lately to mitigate this issue are internal audit function and audit committees. 
Internal audit is crucial to companies since it produces services to management such as 
preventing fraud, fraud analysis, assurances regarding internal control, risk analysis and 
ensuring compliance with firms’ policies and government regulations (Hermanson & 
Rittenberg, 2003). Audit committee’s main objective is to ensure the trustworthiness and 
credibility of financial statements published by the firms by monitoring the process of 
financial reporting (Bradbury et al., 2006). So, it is important to figure out the effectiveness 
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of audit committee members expertise in overseeing the works performed by internal 
auditors and to what extent companies are willing to invest in internal audit function. 
 
The primary goal of this study is to examine the relationship between audit committee 
members expertise and internal audit budget in Malaysia. Top 100 companies listed in 
Bursa Malaysia after excluding financial firms, REITS and newly listed companies were 
selected to examine the proposed relationship. To fulfil the objectives of the study, panel 
data analysis was employed. Regression analysis was estimated utilizing Driscoll and 
Kraay’s standard errors in fixed effects model to control for autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity, and cross-sectional dependence. The study sets out five hypotheses that 
were examined and analyzed. The study hypothesized that there is a significant relationship 
between (i) AC experience in accounting, (ii) AC experience in audit, (iii) AC members 
who have worked at BIG Four, (iv) AC members academic qualifications, (v) AC members 
professional qualifications and internal audit budget. 
 
The regression analysis shows that independent and control variables expound 78% of the 
changes that occur to internal audit budget. The findings show that the existence of 
experienced audit committee members in accounting leads to higher internal audit budget. 
This finding is consistent with hypothesis Ha1 and complementary perspective. The results 
support the argument that experienced audit committee members in accounting, to have 
their reputation protected, are more careful in safeguarding the process of financial 
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reporting, so they require more internal audit works which lead to investing more in internal 
audit function. 
 
Likewise, the results indicate a positive and significant effect of audit committee members 
professional qualification investment in internal audit budget. The findings show that those 
members who are professionally qualified tend to be more cautious when dealing with 
internal controls and other duties assigned to internal auditors. Their attentive behavior 
towards internal audit function is due to their past daily life as practitioners of audit. They 
fully understand the worthiness of internal audit function, so they require a larger scope of 
work by internal auditors to ensure the company’s performance as well as their reputation 
are not harmed. This finding is consistent with Ha5 and complementary perspective.  
 
Moreover, the study’s findings show a negative and significant relationship between those 
who have worked with BIG Four audit firms and internal audit budget. This finding is 
consistent with hypothesis Ha3 and substitution perspective. It suggests that the existence 
of BIG Four experts in AC develops the internal control system effectiveness and financial 
report quality which lead to reducing the need for additional works done by internal audit 
department. Similarly, the regression analysis displays a negative and significant impact of 
audit committee members academic qualification on investment in internal audit. The 
findings suggest that those members educated academically tend to believe their own 
knowledge of internal audit functions may replace some duties conducted by internal 
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auditors, so they provide internal auditors with lesser scope of works. This finding supports 
Ha4 and substitution hypothesis. 
  
 The results, however, reveal a non-significant impact of experience members in auditing 
with investment in internal audit which means hypothesis Ha2 was not supported. The 
findings suggest that those members who have experience in auditing are less likely to have 
controlling nor monitoring function over internal audit resources which contradict with 
agency theory argument. Appointing expertise in audit committee would most likely lead 
to reduce agency problem and agency costs. Managers would appoint voluntarily 
experienced audit committee members to send a message to shareholders that financial 
statements are reliable and trustworthy.  
 
5.3 Implications of the Study 
Implications of the study can be divided into three, namely theoretical, academic and 
regulatory and practical implications. 
 
5.3.1 Theoretical Implications 
The outcome yielded from the present study have important theoretical contribution that 
may add to the perspective of agency theory. Agency theoretical perspective and 
substitution and complementary hypotheses can explain the significant relationship 
between audit committee members expertise (accounting experience, BIG Four 
89 
 
experience, academic qualifications and professional qualifications) and internal audit 
budget. Agency theory shows how agents try to maximize their wealth even if it means 
making losses for the company. As a result, agency costs arise when principals appoint 
audit committee members to oversee and monitor the works performed by managers. 
Appointing audit committee members expertise and internal audit function are two parts of 
agency costs. The current study adds to agency theory by revealing the significant 
relationship between these two parts and validates the agency theory perspective in 
Malaysian context.  
 
5.3.2 Academic Implications 
The current study provides serious attention to four significant factors that impact internal 
audit budget in Malaysian listed firms. The current study will be useful to researchers and 
academics whose focus areas of research are internal audit and audit committee expertise. 
Literature on internal audit is still limited, so this study can provide more knowledge to 
those who wish to investigate in internal audit area.  
 
5.3.3 Regulatory and Practical Implications 
This study reinforces the policy makers and organizers perceptions on the effects of audit 
committee members expertise and internal audit budget in the environment of Malaysia. In 
addition, this study helps to comprehend internal audit profession especially in Malaysia. 
Further, the outcome of this research implies that Bursa Malaysia and MICG must pay 
more attention to elements such as accounting and auditing experience, academic and 
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professional qualifications when setting up rules to govern Malaysian listed companies. 
Moreover, public companies could use the results to ensure appointing the appropriate 
members in their audit committees to have better monitoring on internal audit function. 
Furthermore, internal auditors could use this paper to provide suggestions to the 
management on how to reduce internal audit budget. Internal auditors can enhance their 
performance quality when they reinforce a good and professional relationship with audit 
committee members. In addition, the findings of this study could be useful for the public 
and other stakeholders to be able to understand the reason behind a high or low internal 
audit budget among companies. Finally, the findings enable investors to evaluate the role 
of internal audit function in developing the process of financial reporting with the help of 
audit committees.   
 
5.4 Limitations of the Study 
The current study has some limitations that must be reported to ensure that the outcome is 
fairly interpreted. First, it covers only 100 companies in Malaysia, so the findings might 
not be generalized to small firms since there are over 900 companies listed in Bursa 
Malaysia. Second, this research focuses on the role of audit committee expertise on the 
available resources for internal audit. Characteristics of AC such as independence, 
diligence and tenure could be studied in relation to internal audit budget. Moreover, other 
factors that may affect internal audit function includes internal audit employees’ 
availability and qualifications, head of internal audit function, internal audit function size 
and meetings of internal audit department. Companies are still not required to disclose 
these information in their annual reports, so future studies can use primary data to extract 
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such information. Finally, this research studies Malaysian companies only, so whether the 
findings of this study could be generalized to companies in other countries remain 
unsolved.    
 
5.5 Future Research 
The limitations mentioned above can be the base for proposing avenues for future research. 
First, larger size of sample selection in future study could be taken in mind to enable the 
researcher to generalize his findings. Further, future study could analyze a larger context, 
such as including other countries that fall within the same cultural and environmental 
factors with Malaysia. Moreover, future study could also make a comparison between 
developed and developing markets regarding the proposed relationship. In addition, future 
research could examine the relationship in countries where internal audit function is not 
required by law. Furthermore, the current study employs agency theory, other theories such 
as stewardship theory and resource dependence theory could be tested within the same 
model. Finally, the current study uses five factors of expertise to study the suggested 
relationship, other factors such as industry experience and legal experience could be tested 
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